UIC Law Review
Volume 54

Issue 4

Article 2

2021

Martial Misconduct and Weak Defenses: A History Repeating
Itself (Except When it Doesn’t), 54 UIC L. Rev. 867 (2021)
Dan Maurer

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Dan Maurer, Martial Misconduct and Weak Defenses: A History Repeating Itself (Except When it Doesn’t),
54 UIC L. Rev. 867 (2021)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol54/iss4/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

MARTIAL MISCONDUCT AND WEAK
DEFENSES: A HISTORY REPEATING
ITSELF (EXCEPT WHEN IT DOESN’T)
DAN MAURER*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 869
BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITARY CRIME AND PUNISHMENT . 873
A. Roman Ancestors ..................................................... 873
B. English Forebearers ..................................................... 876
C. The Swedish Cousin ................................................ 883
D. Great Britain as Parent and Surrogate ................. 889
III. SOME GENERALIZATIONS ON CONTINUITY ...................... 891
IV. DISCONTENTS AND THE DEMILITARIZATION OF MILITARY
LAW ................................................................................. 894
A. Law to “Startle and Perplex the American Lawyer”
.................................................................................. 894
B. “An Organism Provided by Law” ............................ 899
C. Ansell’s Arguments for Reform ............................... 901
D. The Kernan Board ................................................... 915
E. Ansell’s Criticisms of the Kernan Board ................ 921
V. (UNSUCCESSFUL) ARGUMENTS ........................................ 926
A. Past Claims in Defense of Convention – a Scared
Theology ................................................................... 826
B. Present Claims in Defense of Convention – a
Privileged Position................................................... 827
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 931

Abstract
This article explains how the debate over military justice
reform, ongoing in Congress, within the Department of Defense, and
in public conversation, ignores to its detriment several important
factors – one involving subject matter jurisdiction, the other
involving a set of normative claims – making this debate historically
deficient. First, it ignores the key and historically accurate link
between the outer limits of commanders’ criminal jurisdiction and
the military harms they need to deter. Second, defenders of the status
quo unaccountably repeat a number of failed or weak arguments in
justifying the reach of these commanders over misconduct that has
neither historical nor empirical claims to legitimacy.
Military Justice is the body of criminal law and procedure
* Assistant Professor of Law, U.S. Military Academy; Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. For their time, insight, and helpful
comments on various aspects of this article, special thanks to Joshua
Kastenberg, Geoffrey Corn, Eugene Fidell, and David Schlueter. The opinions
and research in this article reflect those of the author alone and should not be
taken as representative of official policy or official analysis of the U.S.
Government.
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that regulates the conduct of millions of Americans based solely on
their employment status. It has a history that predates the
Constitution, but a strong pedigree is not an immunity from
criticism. In fact, public interest and legislative skepticism about
military justice’s more idiosyncratic features has not been this high
since the ancient Articles of War (for the Army) and the Articles for
the Government of the Navy were finally combined, reformed, and
rationalized in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (1950). Intense
and repeated criticism over the last decade from servicemember
victims and their advocates in and out of uniform have centered
almost exclusively on two issues: first, the crimes of sexual assault
and sexual harassment; second, the investigative, prosecutorial, and
(at times) judicial-like powers of lay commanding officers – those
who are neither lawyers nor elected officials accountable to the public
nor to a legal code of professional responsibility that traditionally
works as constraints on prosecutorial abuse and error. This criticism
has sired a predictable and vigorous defense of the status quo. This
defense concludes that conventional legal authorities vested in those
officers with high command responsibility are not only not a problem
but actually the solution to the effective prevention and punishment
of such crimes. The claims made in defense come from within the
military services and from former commanders and judge advocates,
yet the claims have not had the persuasive effect that has long buoyed
incremental adjustments over time, civilianizing major components
of military justice but eschewing wholescale reform.
In a recent twist, acknowledging where the gravity of public
support actually lies, the Department of Defense and the president
have agreed to make changes to the scope of certain commanding
officers’ prosecutorial discretion, but only for sex crimes. This article
suggests that weak arguments supporting a military justice status
quo – indeed, arguments favoring reform too – have inexplicably
ignored two facts: (1) some, but not all, idiosyncratic elements of
military codes of criminal law have displayed a certain degree of
continuity overlaid on generally-accelerating civilianization; and (2)
the arguments against increasing civilianization of due process and
for the continuity of traditional authorities are also shockingly
consistent with arguments made one hundred years ago before and
after World War I. For the first time, these claims are systematically
and thematically organized, revealing two related leitmotifs. Those
arguments ultimately failed, but only in pieces. The failure to
address and fully rationalize the linkage between the types of
misconduct within the military’s interest and the corresponding
interests and roles of commanders has led inevitably to this current
inflection point where Congress must decide how it wants the
nation’s military to police itself. It is in Congress’s, and the Armed
Forces’, interest to pay heed to what history can illuminate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If you were so unlucky as to be a common Roman foot-soldier,
or even a more privileged centurion, in the time of the Republic or
centuries later under the Empire, in an army legion that
occasionally displayed characteristics of insubordination or
cowardice before an enemy force, you faced an uncomfortable and
possibly very short future. If you had been deemed a coward for
quitting your sentry post or avoiding direct contact of the enemy
with your chariot during a charge, you could foresee the very likely
event of your being cudgeled to death by your superiors.1 But should
you be, personally, innocent but assigned to a larger unit in which
such desertion or cowardice was open and widespread, your fate was
in the hands of chance. Your legion would be divided into cohorts,
and those cohorts further subdivided into groups of ten. You and the
other nine soldiers would draw straws, with the shortest straw
marking the sacrificial subject. Rather than weaken a large portion
of the army in the midst of a field campaign through mass corporal
punishment, death, or banishment, but in order to achieve a
maximum deterrent effect at the same time, only this one unlucky
soldier, one in every ten, would endure the punishment—and
ultimately death. The luckier nine served as the collective
executioner, cudgeling or stabbing the sacrificial victim/convict to
death (and thus the term: decimation).2
If you were a common soldier sailing with Richard the
Lionheart to the Holy Land to participate in the Third Crusade, you
would be incentivized to keep one’s temper and greed under control,
for if you happened to kill another while on board a vessel at sea,
1. This military disciplinary punishment was called Fustuarium in Latin
and was a harsher alternative to flogging or public disgracing. POLYBIUS,
HISTORIES 6:38
(Evelyn
S.
Shuckburgh
trans.,
1962)
(1889),
www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0234%3
Abook%3D6%3Achapter%3D38 [perma.cc/J9JE-WKBF] (Polybius’ book covered
a fifty-three-year period in the mid-Second Century BCE, from Hannibal’s
Spanish Campaign to the Battle of Pydna). Beating the undisciplined with clubs
was common practice among Spartan officers, who carried their “bakērtia” as
part of their uniform of office. Simon Hornblower, Sticks, Stones, and Spartans:
the sociology of Spartan violence, in WAR AND VIOLENCE IN ANCIENT GREECE
58-59 (Hans van Wees ed., 2009).
2. POLYBIUS, supra note 1. Polybius remains our best source for
contemporaneous reports and analysis of the practice. Charles Goldberg,
Decimation in the Roman Republic, 111.2 THE CLASSICAL J. 141 (Dec. 2015—
Jan. 2016) (“Polybius’ military knowledge and experience . . . indicate that
decimatio was performed regularly enough in his day to qualify as a standard
disciplinary measure for the legion.” Id. at 143-44). See also SARA ELISE PHANG,
ROMAN MILITARY SERVICE: IDEOLOGIES OF DISCIPLINE IN THE LATE REPUBLIC
AND EARLY PRINCIPATE 128 (2008) (quoting Roman Senator, jurist, and
suppressor of Spartacus’ Revolt in 72 A.D.: “For when in a defeated army every
tenth man is struck down with clubs, the brave meet the same fortune.
Exemplary punishment always contains an element of injustice, but the public
good outweighs the disadvantage of individuals”).
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you would have been tied to your victim’s corpse and thrown
overboard.3 If you killed on land, you would have been tied to the
victim’s corpse and buried. If you slapped another with the palm of
your hand, you would have been “thrice ducked in the sea,” but if
you committed an assault with a knife, you would have lost your
hand.4 If caught stealing from a fellow soldier or sailor, you would
have been “shorn like a champion . . . [with] boiling pitch [to be]
poured” on your head, then covered in down feathers and left at the
first port of call.5
If you were an English nobleman, like Henry of Essex in the
Twelfth Century, tried and convicted of cowardice, you would have
been “deprived of [your] lands, shorn, and shut up for life as a monk
in the Abbey of Reading.”6 Two hundred years later, if, in a
conspiracy, you had given up a castle to the enemy, your noble body
might have been drawn and then hanged, but your conspiratorial
compatriot, a commoner with a good service record, would only have
been beheaded.7
If you were a Sixteenth Century English archer on an
expeditionary campaign in Normandy and accused of anything from
disobedience, inciting an unlawful assembly or sedition, gambling,
being in “disarray” in battle, assaulting a fortification without
permission of the commander, or killing a prisoner captured by
another, you would have been subjected to possible punishments
ranging from drawing, quartering, hanging, beheading,
imprisonment on nothing but bread and water, “riding the wooden
horse,”8 forfeiture of your property, losing a day’s wages, or to be
“punished at the King’s pleasure” or “at the Marshal’s discretion.”9
We have come a long way since these heady days of rapid,
rough “justice” whereby misconduct within the military ranks was,
itself, treated like an enemy force: to be deterred with fear if
possible but to exact the sharpest and swiftest of retribution if and
when this “enemy within” were to strike. Between commission of
these offenses and one’s fate at the hands of other soldiers,
commanders, or kings, lies an important component of disciplina
militaras. The process of separating culpable fact from dubious
allegation, determining guilt and assigning liability, and deciding
the appropriate punishment was anything but uniform over the
millennia.
It is impossible in the space of one article to describe with

3. FRANCIS GROSE, MILITARY ANTIQUITIES RESPECTING THE HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH ARMY FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 59 (1786-88).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 199.
9. Id. at 85-107 (quoting the military code of King Henry VIII, Statutes and
Ordinances for the Warre (1543)).
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sufficient detail or to provide some novel analysis about the long
history of law governing military members’ conduct.10 But to place
in proper context the current challenges that seem poised to uproot
conventional notions of what military justice is for, and what roles
commanders should have, it is necessary to review the wavetop
evolution of the field, and highlight the themes that still resonate
within contemporary military justice – with their “ancient
lineage”11 – that mark its distinguishing, and controversial,
characteristics.
This article fills several important gaps in the literature and
in the public conversation about the fate of the U.S. military justice
system. As Congress continues to project skepticism about the
functions filled by certain high ranking commanding officers in
wake of continued problems with deterring and prosecuting sexual
assault,12 two important facts remain undiscussed. First, a survey

10. For a deeper review of the subject’s history, see Edmund Morgan, The
Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953);
CHRIS BRAY, COURT-MARTIAL: HOW MILITARY JUSTICE HAS SHAPED AMERICA
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 9/11 AND BEYOND (2016); JOSEPH W. BISHOP JR.,
JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW (1974); WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2nd ed. 1920); Norman G. Cooper, Gustavus
Adolphus and Military Justice, 92 MIL. L. REV. 129 (1981); David A. Schlueter,
The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 129 (1980); Walter T.
Cox III, The Army, The Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military
Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1 (Fall 1987); WILLIAM B. AYCOCK & SEYMOUR W.
WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 3-15
(1955); WILLIAM T. GENEROUS JR., SWORDS AND SCALES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (1973); JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, TO
RAISE AND DISCIPLINE AN ARMY: MAJOR GENERAL ENOCH CROWDER, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S OFFICE, AND THE REALIGNMENT OF CIVIL AND
MILITARY RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR I (2017); JONATHAN LURIE, THE SUPREME
COURT AND MILITARY JUSTICE (2013). Much of the history discussed in this Part
is drawn from these valuable studies.
11. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 755 (1975).
12. See Missy Ryan, Pentagon Leaders Have Opposed Plans Overhauling the
Military System for Trying Sexual Assault for Years. Has the Time Come for
Change?, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2021), www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/sexual-assault-military-reform-pentagonresistance/2021/04/10/e5a98a92-96f7-11eb-8e42-3906c09073f9_story.html
[perma.cc/DHK9-LMR7]; Ellen Mitchell, Gillibrand Makes New Push for
Military
Sexual
Assault
Reform,
HILL
(Apr.
29,
2021),
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/550999-gillibrand-makes-new-push-formilitary-sexual-assault-reform [perma.cc/8AGP-3KCT]; Leo Shane III, Major
Overhaul in How the Military Handles Sexual Misconduct Cases May Finally
Happen, MIL. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2021), www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagoncongress/2021/04/29/major-overhaul-in-how-the-military-handles-sexualmisconduct-cases-may-finally-happen/
[perma.cc/LUY4-MGRJ];
Michel
Paradis, Congress Demands Accountability for Service Members, LAWFARE
(June 1, 2021), www.lawfareblog.com/congress-demands-accountabilityservice-members [perma.cc/9Q7J-HQLZ]. For summaries of the legislative
efforts to investigate and drive change in military sexual assault prevention and
prosecution, see generally Rodrigo M. Caruço, In Order to Form a More Perfect
Court: A Quantitative Measure of the Military’s Highest Court’s Success as a
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of historical efforts to manage the “good order and discipline” in
armies – whether by a legislature, monarch, or president, and
whether in peacetime or in war – reveals that these criminal justice
codes became increasingly due-process oriented. Nevertheless,
these codes remained concerned almost exclusively with what this
article will refer to as “martial misconduct,” or wrongs and harms
that can only be deemed so in the context of military affairs like
desertion, disobedience, disrespect, and dereliction of duties.
Common law crimes that would be punished through civil courts –
murder, rape, larceny, for example – were left to competent civil
jurisdictions. Commanders were considered important for
determining what behavior was militarily-criminal, for adjudging
guilt, and for imposing punishments, but their discretion was
cabined to circumstances that drew on their expertise and interests.
Second, there has been significant attention paid to the
“civilianization” of military justice in the United States since the
adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) in 1950,
as well the first pangs of institutional reform that immediately
preceded and followed the First World War.13 However, in the
contemporary debates over the legitimacy and value of many
procedural elements of military law, little attention is given to the
fact that many of the same pro-status quo arguments – and those of
the critics – remain shockingly similar to those of a century ago.14
Part I below will survey western military (criminal) history
from the Roman Republic through American Revolution,
highlighting the growth of proto-due process for the benefit of
accused soldiers and sailors and the reach of military codes’ subject
matter jurisdiction.
Part II synthesizes, for the first time, several significant
themes evidencing a type of historical continuity, including that all
of these early “Articles of War” systems scaled punishments to the
gravity of the offense and established some form of stable procedure
to formalize and make routine the investigation, prosecution, and
punishment of those crimes.
Part III recounts the great debates surrounding potential due
process reforms of the American Articles of War bookending World
Court of Last Resort, 41 VT. L. REV. 71(2016); BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON &
CARLA Y. DAVIS-CASTRO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43168, MILITARY SEXUAL
ASSAULT: CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITY IN THE 113TH-114TH CONGRESSES AND
RELATED RESOURCES (2019); KRISTY N. KAMARCK & BARBARA SALAZAR
TORREON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44944, MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2021).
13. The Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearing on H.R. 2498 Before the
H.
Comm.
on
Armed
Services,
81st
Cong.
606
(1949),
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Morgan-Papers/Vol-VI-hearings-on-HR2498.pdf [perma.cc/PGY3-2559]; Fredric I. Lederer, From Rome to the Military
Justice Acts of 2016 and Beyond: Continuing Civilianization of the Criminal
Legal System, 225 MIL. L. REV. 512 (2017).
14. See infra Part IV.
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War I, sparked by highly publicized controversial courts-martial.
These debates, engaging the interests of Congress and the
Commander-in-Chief, occurred largely within the military itself; its
protagonists and antagonists wore the uniform of judge advocate
officers.
Part IV compares the arguments made against reform in the
first two decades of the twentieth century against those in the
twenty-first, marking yet another theme of continuity that has gone
unnoticed.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITARY CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
The history of military law and, particularly, military justice
in the United States is one of long periods of quiescence, interrupted
by cyclical bouts of intense interest and reform, occasioned by war
and the conscription of great numbers of civilians.15
Our military law is very considerably older than our
Constitution . . . taken from pre-existing British Articles having
their inception in remote antiquity.16

A. Roman Ancestors
We can trace official, formal means and methods of inducing
militarily-beneficial conduct among American soldiers – another
way of saying means and methods to deter and punish – back at
least through the Roman Empire. Though in some sense
fragmentary, what we do know about Roman military law (leges
militares) is that there was never really a pure military legal code
as we think of them today – “a regulated system of interior
disciplinary control within the military establishment” distinct
from regulations governing the day-to-day management of armies.17
Rather, what we have are treatises written by Roman jurists at the
time, efforts to organize and explain the customs, practices, and
fundamentals of military legal affairs, and patchwork collections of
various imperial edicts that provided for punitive sanctions on
soldiers for certain offenses, among other administrative
regulations.18 Typical focus was on penalizing cowardice, mutiny,
desertion, violent acts against superiors, and attempts to avoid
service, but the actual definition of these offenses and their
punishments was generally left to the vagaries, moods, and
impulses of commanders.19
The closest Roman analogue to a modern code of military
15. BISHOP, supra note 10 at xv.
16. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 15, 17.
17. C.E. BRAND, ROMAN MILITARY LAW 126-28 (1968).
18. Id.
19. Id.; Schlueter, supra note 10, at 129-44.
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justice was the Military Laws of Ruffus.20 This proto code consisted
of sixty-five articles or rules. Subjects ranged from servicedisqualifying events (e.g., article 3: “adulterers or those convicted of
any other public crime”) and prohibitions on holding civil office
while serving (article 7); to prohibitions and punishments for,
among other things: conspiracy to “foment mutiny against their
commander, from whatever cause” (article 10); insubordination
(article 11); disorderly conduct, rioting, and disturbing the peace
(articles 16-20); self-harm to avoid service (articles 23 and 24);
fleeing from battle or an unwarranted retreat (articles 25, 26, 31,
32, 33, and 34); disobeying a command or order (article 30);
drunkenness causing the soldier to “err and transgress” (article 45);
evading military service (article 50); feigning illness (article 52);
revealing plans to the enemy (article 53); and desertion (articles 5763).21
The Emperor Maurice, of the eastern Byzantine Empire in the
late Sixth Century, wrote and promulgated the Strategica,
effectively “Articles of War” that acted as instructions to soldiers
upon their entry into military service.22 It included direction to
commanders to disseminate these instructions to their troops when
embarking on active operations.23 These instructions prohibited the
kind of behavior, sometimes under threat of “suffer[ing] the extreme
penalty,”24 thought to degrade a commander’s ability to conduct
those operations successfully or that which would foreseeably
increase the risk to one’s forces and plans. It punished what you
would expect a warrior emperor to punish: sedition or mutiny
against the commander; quitting a guard post without authority;
desertion; failure to comply with orders; neglecting to maintain
one’s weapons;25 plundering the dead; attempting a “hasty and
disordered pursuit” of the enemy; and providing for the practice of
decimation when units flee the field of battle “without just and
manifest cause.”26
From the various Latin treatises discussing Roman military
law, we know that this body of regulated behavior did not define
what modern legal usage calls “elements” of each offense, specifying

20. Schlueter, supra note 10, at 141 (the identity of Ruffus, also spelled
“Rufus,” has not been established, though suspected to be acutely familiar with
military command and combat, and thought by some to Emperor Maurice of
Byzantine (assuming throne from Tiberius in 582 CE)); BRAND, supra note 17,
at 135-36.
21. Leges Militares ex Ruffo (“Military Laws from Ruffus”), reprinted and
translated in BRAND, supra note 17, at 148-69.
22. Maurice, Strategica, Chapter VI, reprinted and translated in BRAND,
supra note 17, at 194-95.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 196.
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an actus reus and mens rea.27 However, this law did concern itself
with distinctions between “common” criminal offenses and those
specifically military. “Specifically military” misconduct was defined
as an offense that can only be committed by a “person in his capacity
as a soldier” (in other words, it would be legally impossible to
condemn and punish a civilian for feigning illness to avoid combat,
or for disobeying a commander’s order).28 One such notable offense
– one that continues today in the UCMJ, is any “disorder to the
prejudice of the common discipline” including “offenses of laziness,
of insolence, or of idleness.”29
Rome’s military law observed and administered a spectrum of
military punishments tied to the severity or gravity of the offense –
desertion in the face of the enemy, for example, was punished by
death.30 But this spectrum included not just corporal punishments
but other forms of rebuke that we would today call “administrative
corrective measures” or “non-judicial punishment.”31 Examples
included fines, compulsory (extra) duties, transfer to other
occupational branches of the army, reduction in rank, and various
kinds of discharge from the service.32 In fact, even among the most
serious of offenses (desertion in battle), the law permitted
punishment to be scaled based on the specific considerations of the
case and characteristics of the accused: the duration of the
desertion, whether he returned to duty unforced, what branch he
served in, his rank, where he was posted, his previous conduct,
whether he was alone or with others, and whether it was in
connection with some other crime.33
Moreover, Roman commanders had certain expectations thrust
upon them by virtue of their command roles, separate from their
duty to accomplish a military mission but undoubtedly related to
satisfying that duty. For instance, commanders were expected to
lead training, keep soldiers in their camps and fortifications,
periodically “make rounds” to observe and inspect the diligence of
the sentries, to approve rations, prevent fraud, to “hear complaints
27. Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952).
28. Arrius Menander, Libro Primo de re Militari (“Military Affairs, Book I”),
reprinted and translated in BRAND, supra note 17, at 171.
29. Compare Menander, Libro Tertio de re Militari (“Military Affairs, Book
III”), quoted in BRAND, supra note 17, at 183, and supra note 18, at 183, n. 11
with 10 U.S.C. § 934.
30. POLYBIUS, supra note 1.
31. UNITED STATES MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Part V (2019).
32. BRAND, supra note 17, at 172-73. Brand notes the transfer to other
branches was a form of shaming: there existed a hierarchy of prestige among
the branches, with cavalry superior to infantry, which was superior to “labor
battalions.” Id. at 173, n. 3. Macer, Libro Primo de re Militari (“Military Affairs,
Book II”), quoted in BRAND, supra note 17, at 189 (noting the three kinds of
discharge: honorable, for-cause, and dishonorable – the latter a consequence of
conviction of a crime).
33. Menander, Libro Secundo de re Militari (“Military Affairs, Book II”),
quoted in BRAND, supra note 17, at 181.
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of their fellow soldiers, inspect the sick, and to “punish offenses
according to the limits of their authority.”34 Brand notes that –
according to Polybius at least – tribunes and commanders “sat
together in council to try an offender . . . and thus constituted in fact
a court-martial—the first of which we have any record.”35
Nevertheless, Roman military discipline was centered on enforcing
the commander’s will in order to achieve military goals – not to
ensure Roman legionnaires were morally upright citizens of the
communities they ostensibly defended. The patriarchal
authoritarian nature of Roman society was cemented in Roman civil
law – the power of patriapotestas was vested in the male head of
each household (paterfamilias) – and naturally fit within a
hierarchical structure of an army: “unrestricted discretion of its
commander [was] the natural order.”36 Orders from commanders
were unappealable, “unquestioned law.”37

B. English Forebearers
After the fall and fracture of the Roman Empire, and before the
late Middle Ages, myriad Italian, German and French (Norman)
principalities and kingdoms of Lombards, Goths, and Bavarians
each had variations of some sort of chieftain-led military tribunal to
govern their forces both in peacetime and in conflict.38 Professor
Schlueter notes that over the succeeding centuries, “amidst the
intense rivalries for land and power and the usual accompanying
dishonorable practices, ‘chevaliers’ vowed to maintain order, and to
uphold the values of honor, virtue, loyalty, and courage.”39 These
chevaliers were the landed gentry and nobles, acted as judge and
jury, and their jurisdiction included their peers and dependents
(like a form of separate community self-regulation).40 These
informal dispute arbiters and nascent martial judges preceded the
formalizing of such standing structures and systems by the
Normans into “courts of chivalry.”41 William brought this method of
law and order with him when he crossed the channel and conquered
34. Macer, Libro Primo de re Militari (“Military Affairs, Book II”), quoted in
BRAND, supra note 17, at 189.
35. Macer, supra note 32, quoted in BRAND, supra note 17, at 188-89, n. 13.
36. Id.
37. BRAND, supra note 17, at 42-43. One noted scholar-soldier-lawyer,
General Henry Halleck (General-in-Chief, later Chief of Staff, of the Union
Army under Secretary of War Stanton), believed that the power of the Roman
military judges (magistri militum) also included jurisdiction over civil actions
between soldiers and civil or criminal claims brought by civilians against
soldiers. Henry Wager Halleck, Military Tribunals and their Jurisdiction, 5 AM.
J. INT’L L. 958, (1911), reprinted in MIL. L. REV. BICENT. ISS. 15 (1975).
38. Schlueter, supra note 10, at 131-32.
39. Id. at 132.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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the English in 1066, incorporating the chivalry forum within his
supreme court, the Aula Regis.42
In 1189, Richard I, as briefly recounted above, instituted a
rather draconian-seeming set of prohibitions and punishments on
soldiers working their way to the Holy Land to fight in the Third
Crusade.43 Though pouring boiling pitch on someone or burying
them alive next to their victim may seem unnecessarily brutal and
unusual, they were not considered either by the standards of the
day, at least when compared to the routine punishment meted out
by civilian criminal justice: drawing and quartering,
disemboweling, placing decapitated heads on pikes, etc.44 The
military-aimed punishments were ostensibly cruel and discretionless exercises in command prerogative to swiftly end disputes and
deter misconduct through fear, but not categorically different than
punishing all civilian felonies with “mutilation and death.”45
Edward I (1272-1307) created a specific “Court of Chivalry”
managed by two senior members of the royal administration: the
“Lord High Constable” and “Earl Marshall” – the former essentially
the King’s ranking general and the latter acting as a kind of human
resources-managing Adjutant General with ministerial powers to
“marshal” the troops and keep the rolls of officers and soldiers.46
Their combined “ministerial” and “judicial” jurisdiction “extended
to matters of arms and matters of war,” but were explicitly not
intended to be bound by English common law nor to regulate the
conduct of anyone outside of service in the armies.47 Specifically,
these “courts of honor” or “courts of chivalry” (also eventually called
“courts-martial”) primarily adjudicated three kinds of cases: civil
cases of “death or murder beyond the sea,” the “rights of prisoners
taken in war” and – of most relevance to the evolution of military
justice – “Offenses and Miscarriages of Soldiers contrary to the
Laws and Rules of the Army.”48
Richard II, in 1385 or 1386, published twenty-six rules or
ordinances that prohibited, among other things, group desertion
(under penalty of beheading and forfeiture of all property to the
king), robbing or pillaging of churches, attacks on or capturing
unarmed holy men, crying “havok!” (a military commander giving
an order to cause chaos and mayhem by allowing soldiers to pillage
and otherwise wantonly ransack and destroy civilian property),
displays of grudge-holding by contests in which a participant could
42. Id. at 136.
43. POLYBIUS, supra note 1.
44. AYCOCK & WURFEL, supra note 10, at 3.
45. Id.
46. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND
36-38 (1739); James Stuart-Smith, Military Law: Its History, Administration
and Practice?, 85 L.Q. REV. 478 (1969), reprinted in MIL. L. REV. BICENT. ISS.
25, 28 (1975).
47. Id.
48. Id.; WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 46.
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be killed (i.e., dueling), and required enemy prisoners to be
safeguarded so that they would be available for interrogations.49 It
also required obedience to commanders and dutiful performance of
military tasks.50
Henry V (1413-1422), considering war to be “inevitable,” issued
general articles of war specifically to corral the:
noxious appetites . . . under the rule of justice, by which mankind are
informed how to live honestly . . . without injuring each other,
rendering to everyone their right. And that our army, as well in peace
as war, may be led in the proper path, and the said common good
preserved entire; and also on the other part that the constable and
mareschal [sic] of our said army may judge and determine the more
prudently in the causes daily brought before them.51

He ordered this “constitution” to be proclaimed publicly and
required that each captain have a copy of it so that “all concerned
may not pretend ignorance” of its restrictions.52
Given that, by this point in European history, most adults still
fervently believed in witchcraft, thought that mice spontaneously
generated in straw piles, were convinced that murdered corpses
bled in the presence of its murderer, and understood that stars,
planets, and the sun orbited a fixed Earth, it seems quite humane
and modern by standards of his time.53 It recognized the reality that
“honorable” combat often is blighted by the stain of despicable deeds
that undermine the functioning of the army in the field and sully
the reputation of the king or his wartime effort. And so, Henry
required a degree of civility and restraint among his armed forces,
imposed at least tacit duties on his subordinate commanders to keep
their troops in line, and recognized the desirability of an organized
set of expectations so that those being judged were judged fairly.
Stealing from churches, chapels, and monasteries was prohibited
with capital punishment for anyone “laying violent hands on said
priests,”54 and rape also carried the death penalty; quitting of guard
duty was of course criminalized.55 These articles also reminded the
troops of their agency relationship to the crown: all “soldiers, and
49. GROSE, supra note 3, at 60-65.
50. One (much later) Chief Justice of the British court was quite pleasantly
surprised by how “remarkable” this “elaborate code” really was: it was “minute
in its details to a degree that might serve as a model to anyone drawing up a
code of criminal law. They follow the soldier into every department of military
life and service. They point out his duties to his officers, his duties to his service,
his duties to his comrades, his duties with regard to the unarmed population
with whom he may come into contact.” R. v. Nelson & Brand (1867), Cockburn’s
report, 89.
51. Reprinted in GROSE, supra note 3, at 68.
52. Id. at 69.
53. DAVID WOOTEN, THE INVENTION OF SCIENCE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 6-7 (2015).
54. Reprinted in GROSE, supra note 3, at 69.
55. Id. at 70.
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other persons receiving wages from us, or our kingdom, shall be
obedient to their immediate captain or masters, in all things legal
and honest.”56 Commanders were barred from “fraudulent
mustering” or reporting their numerical strength purposefully
inaccurately; dueling was prohibited, as was “plundering” of
merchants, physicians, and barbers; soldiers were barred from
launching assaults on castles or fortresses without orders to do so;
and prostitutes (“publick and common whores”)57 were banned from
the camps – they must be “stationed together afar off from the
army,” at least a league distant.58
In the reign of King Henry VIII (1509-1547), commanders could
dispose of indiscipline in the field, but the government also
possessed another venue back in London.59 The court – presided
over by the “Marshall” – was directed to sit twice per week, on
Mondays and Thursdays.60 The court consisted of a judge martial,
auditor, under-provosts, “gaoloers” (jailors), “tipstaves” (a clerk for
the judge), and an executioner.61 The preamble to his “Statutes and
Ordinances for the Warre” (1543) speaks of his desire for the “due
observation of laws and good order,” and – like earlier monarchs –
demanded soldiers’ obedience to their officers; prohibited fraudulent
musters; required commanders to ensure their soldiers were paid
due wages; banned engendering “grudgings” against the king to
prevent “murder, division, dissention, sedition, “stirring” or the
“commocyon of the people;” proscribed “disarraying” oneself in
battle; and prohibited gambling and crying havok.62
But his articles also appear somewhat progressive, offering
limited appellate rights:
if any man finde himself grieved after final sentence, that hee be at
his appele before the marshall at all seasons . . . and for all causes
made between any of them, and any other person of the army, that
there, they, or any of them, abyde the judgment of the marshall and
his court.63

They provided for rules for taking prisoners (death penalty if
one kills the prisoner captured by another; cannot sell or ransom
one’s prisoner without special license from the “capteyne”); they
prohibited “making inroads into enemy territory without
permission from the king” or “chief-taynes of the ward;” and
prohibited the robbing and pillaging of any lodgings where women
were tending to children.64
56. Id.
57. Id. at 79.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 54.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 85-95.
63. Id. at 99.
64. Id. at 99-105.
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These edicts were, in turn, translated by subordinate
commanders (select members of the nobility) into something
remotely akin to a campaign- or deployment-specific general order,
each proscribing certain conduct on or near the battlefield: “lawes
and ordonnances of warre established for the better conduct of the
service in the Northern parts, by his excellence the Earl of
Northumberland, Lord General of his Majestie’s armie and fleete.”65
Blasphemy was punished by boring the tongue of the offender with
a red-hot iron.66 Missing sermons and prayers was prohibited; death
would accompany “traitorous words against his majesty’s sacred
person, or royal authority;” negligent or careless service was
criminalized, as was quarrelling with a superior officer; as today,
mutiny, sedition, and “departing . . . without license” (i.e., AWOL)
were serious offenses.67 Such orders also banned adultery, theft,
provoking or reproachful words, murder, slovenly reporting for
duty, pawning off military equipment, straggling, extorting money
or spoiling victuals from subjects when marching through their
country, giving “false alarm” in camp, drawing one’s sword in a
private quarrel, sleeping or being drunk while on sentinel duty.68
Penalties ranged from forfeiture of goods to loss of pay, riding the
wooden horse, imprisoned to survive on bread and water alone,
banishment from camp, death, “death without mercy,” and
“punishment at the King’s discretion.”69 Soldiers who retreated
before coming to blows with the enemy were punished with a
variation of the Roman decimation: every tenth man would be
punished at the discretion of the commander while the rest would
serve as lowly and dishonorable “scavengers” until a “worthy exploit
take off that blot.”70 These rules of conduct also imposed duties on
commanders and officers. They must not defraud their troops of pay,
they must stop troops from dueling, and be on the watch for
drunkenness and quarrelling among their soldiers.71 They were
prohibited from creating fraudulent muster sheets that deceitfully
enlarged the number of soldiers on the rolls with “counterfeit
troopers.”72
But rules are just arbitrary dictates without stable and
consistent processes to administer “justice” over these soldiers when
those dictates are ignored or violated. These supplementary orders,
derived from the King’s Articles of Warre,73 provided for a
semblance of necessary due process: for instance, in order to turn

65. Id. at 107.
66. Id. at 108.
67. Id. at 107-11.
68. Id. at 112-17.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 119.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 119-20.
73. Id. at 107.
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over a criminally-accused prisoner to the Marshall General, the
captor must provide the “cause and reason” – if not given, the
prisoner was not accepted.74 Once imprisoned, though, the
information about the alleged crime for which the prisoner stood
accused was to be handed over to the advocate of the army within
forty-eight hours; if not, the prisoner was released.75 Perhaps just
as importantly, these prohibitions and rules were transparent:
commanders were obliged to post and publish the codes and Articles
of Warre so that no soldier could claim ignorance of the military’s
expectations and so that they may “thereafter govern themselves.”76
By the reign of James I (1567-1603), the courts seemed to have
merged into a “court or council of war,” ordered by the military
commander in chief, or sitting at certain stated times.77 Officers in
the rank of colonel or higher sat as “assessors or members” of the
court, and court was presided over by a “president of the high court
of war.”78 Not a lawyer himself, the president was assisted by a
“learned fiscal or judge advocate” and a “well-experienced auditor”
for record-keeping.79 By the end of his reign and the beginning of
Charles,’ cases began to be heard by commissions of civil and
military personnel drawn from where the army was then posted
(domestically, like Dover, or Portsmouth), trying soldiers or camp
followers under martial law.80
By the second half of the seventeenth century, English military
justice was governed by ad hoc regulations (really, derivative
articles of war) promulgated by the nobility under whose command
authority the Crown’s armies were formed and led.81 The
consequences of military law were meted out through an
increasingly more complex and nuanced court-martial system,
divided between “general” and “regimental” courts, probably
influenced by the Swedish Articles of War of Adolphus (1621) which
had by then made their way to the British Isles and been
translated.82 James’ Rules for Councils of War provided for where
trials of fact were to be held (in the field, in the general’s quarters
or tent; in garrison, in the colonel’s quarters if encamped, the
governor’s home if not); provided for the sequence in which opinions
of the courts’ members would be heard during deliberations (in
order of rank, from junior to senior); and provided that the court or

74. Id. at 124, note (n).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 126-27 (see 10 U.S.C. § 937, Article 137, UCMJ, for the same duty
on commanders, for the same reasons).
77. Id. at 54-55.
78. Id. at 55.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 56.
81. CHARLES M. CLODE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER MILITARY
AND MARTIAL LAW 7-8 (1872).
82. See Part I.C., infra.

882

UIC Law Review

[54:867

council would be presided over by the “president.”83 If the issue was
a criminal matter, the prisoner would be brought before the council
or court, the “information” (charge) read aloud, and the president
would “interrogate the prisoner about the facts;”84 the accused could
offer a defense and evidence was elicited (“proof made”); then the
accused would then be returned to the care of the marshal or
“jailor.”85 The fact-finding members of the court or council, at least
seven officers and usually all at least in the rank of captain, would
then deliberate and vote “according to his conscience, and the
ordinances or articles of war.”86 The sentence, if any, was
determined by a plurality of votes; the prisoner was then brought
back to the council and the sentence announced “in the name of the
councel of war, or court-martial.”87 Some punishments were public
– the convicted soldier’s unit would be brought in to watch “that
thereby the soldiers may be deterred from offending.”88
Barrister and military historian Charles Clode, writing in
1872, described Articles of War of pre-Glorious Revolution England
as royal prerogatives and direct commands intended to “confirm and
enforce” certain “military obligations” – an enforcement mechanism
for a three-way contract or agreement:
At present the Officer’s agreement is:—1. As towards his inferiors, to
take charge of the Officers and Soldiers serving under him, to exercise
and well discipline them in arms, and to keep them in good order and
discipline (those under him being commanded to obey him as their
superior Officer.) 2. As towards the Crown and his superiors, to
observe and follow such orders and directions as rom time to time he
shall receive from the Sovereign or any of his superior Officers,
according to the rules and discipline of law. The Soldier’s agreement
(usually confirmed by his oath) is:—1. To defend the Sovereign, his
crown and dignity, against all enemies; and, 2. To observe and obey
all orders of his Majesty and of the Generals and Officers set over
him.89

Like prior rulers, the King published his own rules as
“Ordinances of War” as useful but interim directives dealing with
the behavior of troops raised into a temporary army for a particular
campaign or war.90 But the Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought
forth both new Royals (William and Mary) and a new interest and
investment by Parliament in regulating the conduct of the
monarchy’s new standing army – mostly in recognition of and to
deter mutinies of large swaths of the army like the one in which

83. CLODE, supra note 81, at 42.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; accord, GROSE, supra note 3, at 137-39.
89. CLODE, supra note 81, at 27.
90. Stuart-Smith, supra note 46, at 26.
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supporters of the ousted James II rejected the new authority of
William and Mary.91 Parliament enacted its first “Mutiny Act” in
1689 (re-enacted annually), which consisted – in effect – of two
parts: Articles of War to be enacted by the King, empowered by
Parliament, and governing his soldiers for most matters of military
discipline, and a “mutiny” law that was binding on all subjects,
regardless of war, and served as a temporary authorization for the
raising and supplying of an army in time of conflict.92 The Munity
Act “recognized” – rather than created afresh – the court-martial as
the English forum for trying soldiers accused of military criminal
acts; such a device had been in use since at least 1666, when an
English court-martial was first fully recorded in writing for
posterity.93
The actual Articles of War, annually reenacted, were
periodically reviewed thereafter, usually at the request of the King;
they were occasionally amended, if at all, after review and
recommendation by his “Board of General Officers,” to conform to
any amendments made to the annual Mutiny Act.94 By that point,
a civilian and politically-appointed “Judge Advocate General”
(“JAG”) position had been created to advise the Board, serve as its
secretary, and oversee the administration of military law
throughout the army.95 This JAG later served as the legal advisor
to the British uniformed “commander-in-chief,” eventually on the
Privy Council, and personally advised the Crown before results of
any court-martial proceeding were confirmed.96

C. The Swedish Cousin
By this time, the British articles of war began to take on the
appearance of, and aimed toward the same purposes as, the famous
1621 edict of Swedish warrior-king Gustavus Adolphus, which had
been translated into English around 1632.97 Adolphus, born in 1594,
91. CLODE, supra note 81, at 10, 31.
92. Id. at 44; GROSE, supra note 3, at 56-57.
93. Thomas Hanslope was charged with speaking “mutinous and
opprobrious words against Sir Thomas Daniell, his Captain,” refused to name a
witness and charged again for contempt of court, was convicted, and sentenced
to “Ride the Wooden horse for six days together during the time of the mounting
of the Guards have his crimes written upon his Breast and back [and] [t]hat he
run the Gantlope, and be Cashier’d and render’d incapable to serve in his
Majesty’s Armies.” FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY
JUSTICE: THE BRITISH PRACTICE SINCE 1689 ESPECIALLY IN NORTH AMERICA 78, n. 6 (1967). Clode remarks that the Mutiny Act was careful to make the
“Common Law supreme” in that it specifically warned against construing the
Act to “exempt any Officer or Soldier whatsoever from the ordinary process of
Law.” CLODE, supra note 81, at 45.
94. Id. at 9-11.
95. Stuart-Smith, supra note 46, at 30-31
96. Id.
97. Published as THE SWEDISH DISCIPLINE, RELIGIOUS, CIVILE, AND
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reigned during part of Europe’s Thirty Years’ War (ruled 1611-32).98
He is long remembered as the George Washington of Sweden: a
prodigious military hero and stately political leader shepherding his
country into the great power status-track.99 At the age of sixteen,
when he inherited the crown from his father, he also inherited three
ongoing wars against Denmark, Poland, and Russia.100 This was an
exceptionally dangerous time for much of Europe: eight million
people – approximately twenty percent of Europe’s population –
died in the Thirty Years’ War.101 Armies were larger and more
spread out geographically than the during medieval and
Renaissance periods, and consisted mainly of conscripts and
mercenaries, and were often led by war profiteering generals who
were not necessarily from the country for whom they fought.
Combat was becoming far costlier in blood and treasure.102
Not surprisingly, looting and extortion by troops in the field
were typical methods of financing on-going operations.103 Larger
armies, fighting for pay and profit not national pride, security, or
ideals, fighting on ever larger battlefields, inevitably led to
command and control problems and the need for greater
regimentation, if not professionalization.104 Soldiers who were
physically disabled by lack of food or toil, or who were hobbled by
the natural psychological features of combat – fear and self-interest
– lacked the necessary morale, unit cohesion, self-control and
wellsprings of courage in the face of danger and terror.105 Weak
command and control over these forces meant that operations were
less predictable, less influenced by the will of the sovereign, less
likely to be part of a coherent national strategy, and far less efficient
and effective.
MILITARY (William Watts & Sir Thomas Roe trans.) (1632).
98. Unless otherwise noted, this section on Gustavus Adolphus and his code
relied on Cooper, supra note 8; Geoffrey Parker, Dynastic War 1494-1660, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF WARFARE 158-59 (Geoffrey Parker ed., 2009 (rev.
ed.); JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE (1993) (passim); William R. Hagan,
Overlooked Textbooks Jettison Some Durable Military Law Legends, 113 MIL. L.
REV. 163 (1986); WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 907-18 (reprinting English
translation of the 1621 Articles); and Schlueter, supra note 10.
99. Ernst Ekman, Three Decades of Research on Gustavus Adolphus, 38 J.
MOD. HIS. 243 (1966) (noting that Swedish popular history remembers him as
“holding a position somewhat analogous to that of Abraham Lincoln;” Ekman’s
description of Adolphus as the country’s “first hero-king” of exceptional military
leadership skill, however, draws him closer to George Washington, an analogy
Ekman actually reserves for Adolphus’ grandfather, King Gustavus Vasa (152360)).
100. Parker, et al., supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 161.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3. Clode quotes Lord Orrey’s Treatise on the Art of War (1677): “It
is not sufficient to make good Rules, unless the Prince or General see them
punctually obeyed, or server punished if broken. CLODE, supra note 81, at 14.
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Two centuries later, Prussian military general and war
theorist Carl von Clausewitz described Adolphus as a military
leader of genius in the ranks of Frederick the Great – one who could
marshal and mobilize, then wield with talent, the “bravery,
adaptability, stamina, and enthusiasm” of national armies.106 His
advances in organization and tactics were considerable for the time
but originated in deep study of contemporary developments in other
nations, like those of Dutch prince Maurice of Nassau (15671625).107 Rather than maneuvering “squares” of slow-moving
pikemen with few large canon, Adolphus adopted linear formations
of infantry that covered significantly more ground and were much
more readily shifted or transferred to reinforce actions, or to take
advantage of weaknesses in the enemy’s positions.108 He, like
Maurice, drilled the ability to conduct volley fire to make up for
musket inaccuracies.109 He sacrificed heavy bombardment for
lighter, more mobile, artillery, and foreshadowed what has become
known as “combined arms maneuver:”110 using artillery and cavalry
in concert with infantry, not in a well-tread scripted sequence. But
these tactical innovations would have been unemployable if he had
not also stressed and thought deeply about how to command and
control his forces over space and time.
Deeply religious, Adolphus worked to reform the quality of his
army – a national force of Swedes, not foreign mercenaries – by
imbuing it with Christian ethics and stern discipline: willing
submission to superior commands, including potential self-sacrifice,
for the sake of larger goals.111 He seemed to have sensed a
relationship between tactical discipline and tactical opportunities
for exploiting the enemy, leading to improved chances of tactical
(and strategic) successes. He used drills not just as tactical
rehearsals but also for instilling discipline. He was convinced that
training was, in a sense, disciplining; and discipline was a factor in
efficiently and effectively controlling forces on the battlefield.112 In
1621, before starting a siege of Riga in Poland, Adolphus published
his famous Articles of War – what amount to warfare-inspired

106. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 188-89 (Michael Howard and Peter
Paret eds. and trans., 1984) (1832).
107. Parker, et al., supra note 98.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Michael Evans, General Monash’s Orchestra: Reaffirming Combined
Arms Warfare, in FROM BREITENFELD TO BAGHDAD: PERSPECTIVES ON
COMBINED ARMS WARFARE, Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper no.
122, at 9 (Michal Evans & Alan Ryan eds.) (2003); and see generally, Gunther
E. Rothenberg, Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo
Montecuccoli, and the “Military Revolution” of the Seventeenth Century, in
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY: FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 3263 (Peter Paret ed.) (1986).
111. Parker, et al., supra note 98.
112. Id.
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reforms in both tactics and in “law” governing the conduct of
troops.113
The 167 provisions of the Adolphus code were published as
orders from the king/commander-in-chief: “for that no government
can stand firmly, unlesse it be first rightly grounded; and that the
Lawes be rightly observed” (Article 17).114 Adolphus informed his
troops of the reason for having such articles: “for the welfare of our
native country” (Article 167) and “Very requisite it is, that good
justice be holden amongst our Soldiers as well as amongst our
Subjects” (Article 135).115 His articles described personal
jurisdiction:
whosoever is minded to serve us in these wars, shall be obliged to the
keepin of these Articles. If any out of presumption, upon any strength,
in any leaguer, in the field, or upon any work, shall do the contrary,
be he native or be he Stranger, Gentlemen, or other, process shall be
made out against him for very time, so long as he serves us in these
wars in the quality of a soldier (Article 166).116

In other words, commoners and nobles, native-born or
foreigners, in camp (“Leaguer”) or in the field, those who bore arms
in service of the country would be bound. Progressively, he imposed
requirements on commanders, who were themselves subject to
punishment for disobedience:
no colonel or captain shall command his soldiers to do any unlawful
thing; which who so does, shall be punished according to the
discretion of the judges; . . . also if any colonel or captain or other
officer whatsoever shall by rigor take any thing way from any
common soldier, he shall answer for it before the court” (Article 46)
no colonel or captain shall lend any of their soldiers to another upon
muster days for the making up of their numbers complete” (Article
121)
if any soldier or native subject desires to be discharged from the wars,
he shall give notice thereof unto the master-masters; who if they find
him to be sick or maimed, or that he served 20 years in our wars, or
has been ten times before the enemy, and can bring good witness
thereof, he shall be discharged” (Article 128)
no captain . . . shall hold back any of his soldiers’ means from him
(Article 132)117

And, like earlier (and later) British codes, leaders were
commanded to read these articles to the soldiers every month in
public, “to the end that no man shall pretend ignorance” (Article

113. Id.
114. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 907-18 (reprinting English translation of
the 1621 Articles).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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167).118
These Articles also imposed what we would call rules of
engagement or tactical directives, a precursor to the principled
prohibitions imposed by modern International Humanitarian Law
(also called the Law of Armed Conflict119). Article 87 prohibited
setting any town on fire in one’s own land, while Article 88
prohibited it in the enemy’s territory unless commanded to so do –
and no captain was authorized to give such an order unless it first
came from a general (and if the act of arson ends up being
advantageous to the enemy, it was punishable by death).120 Articles
89, 92, and 94 prohibited pillaging one’s own subjects or in the
enemy’s land.121 Article 105 mandated that if soldiers took property
from the houses in which they were billeted, the owners were to be
compensated; Article 111 forbade the military arrest of enemy
“princes, officers, gentlemen, counselors of state, senators, burgers,
nor by any fact of violence offend them.”122
As with the earlier Roman and English codes, it also specified
what martial conduct was expected for it outlawed: disobedience to
orders (Articles 18, 25, 26); discrediting comments or violence or
threats against commanders (Article 20, 21, 22); dereliction of
duties (Articles 42, 43, 44, 45); absence without leave (Article 49);
being drunk or asleep on duty/watch/guard (Articles 50, 51); mutiny
(Article 54); running away from battle or refusing to advance out of
fear and cowardice (Articles 61, 62, 63, 64); aiding the enemy
(Articles 70, 71, 72, 76, 77); selling or pawning weapons or supplies
(Article 80); duels (Article 84); and conduct not otherwise proscribed
but which is “repugnant to military discipline” (Article 116).123
But beyond imposing duties on commanders, articulating proto
rules of engagement, and listing criminalized conduct, Adolphus’
Articles also established a judicial-like process and procedures for
determining jurisdiction, finding guilt, and delivering punishment.
For example, his Articles distinguished between “higher” and
“lower” courts-martial: the former being supervised by the
commanding general and high-ranking staff officers with
jurisdiction over major offenses, like treason and conspiracy (Article
150); the lower being supervised by the regimental commander and
officers elected from within his regiment (Article 10); they provided
118. Id.
119. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 8 (2015)
(December 2016 update) (explaining that the “law of war is often called the law
of armed conflict. Both terms can be found in [Department of Defense] directives
and training materials. International humanitarian law is an alternative term
for the law of war that may be understood to have the same substantive
meaning as the law of war.”).
120. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 907-18 (reprinting English translation of
the 1621 Articles).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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that officers would be tried by the general (“higher”) court alone
(Article 152); they provided for limited appeals (Articles 151 and
153); they limited the regimental court to cases of relatively minor
disciplinary issues, like insubordination and theft among soldiers
(Article 153); and they required the members of the fact-finding
court to swear an oath to:124
judge uprightly in all things according to the Lawe of God, or out
Nation, and these Articles of Warre, so farre forth as it pleaseth
Almighty God to give me understanding; neither will I for favour nor
for hatred, for good will, feare, ill will, anger, or any gift or bribe
whatsoever, judge wrongfully; but judge him free that ought to be
free, and doom him guilty, that I finde guilty . . . (Article 144).125

These 1621 Articles have been considered by some to be the
direct lineal ancestor of Britain’s post-civil war Articles of War, the
American Articles, and eventually the UCMJ.126 They punished
unlisted acts that were thought, under the circumstances,
“repugnant to military discipline.”127 They created systems of
hierarchical courts of trial and appeal. Punishments were scaled to
fit the crime. Commanders were duty-bound to instruct
subordinates on the Articles of War, to be honest in strengthreporting, and to care for the well-being and safety of the troops.128
Though not articulated as such, the gravity of a soldier’s offense had
a relation to the type of court that would try him. The articles
limited the scope of jurisdiction to soldiers but included both
commoners and nobles, and whether in camp (garrison) or in the
field.129 Moreover, they criminalized mostly (but not exclusively)
conduct that had an obvious military nexus (e.g., AWOL,
insubordination, threatening or attacking superiors, disobedience
to orders, dereliction of duties, misbehavior before the enemy).130
It is possible to attack as an unsupported “legend” that the
Swedish Articles were novel, arguing instead that Gustavus
Adolphus was “important,” but nonetheless a “follower who built
upon, and simply revised and improved, provisions that English and
Continental predecessors had formulated in the preceding
century.”131 One scholar points in the direction of the French in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: the evolution of the military
position of marechaux – a subordinate, but critical, staff officer

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Schlueter, supra note 10, at 135; MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B.
DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES iv (1906); and
principally, WINTHROP, supra note 10.
127. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 907-18 (reprinting English translation of
the 1621 Articles).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Hagan, supra note 98, at 166.
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working for the commander, with responsibilities over
administration of personnel (including discipline) and camps, and
the “protection of the civil population from the excesses and
depredations of the soldiers.”132 Eventually, the power to discipline
was delegated downward to a new position: the prevot de marechaux
(provost marshal), who both policed the military for misconduct and
presided over its special courts – “[e]mbodied in this officer are the
origins of an organized military justice system.”133 From there,
Hagan notes that even the preeminent biographer of Adolphus,
Michael Roberts, denied the complete originality of the 1621 code:
it borrowed or was obviously influenced by the 1570 code of
Maximilian II and early Sixteenth Century Swedish codes, as well
as by the Englishman Matthew Sutcliffe and his 1593 book, The
Practice, Proceedings, and Lawes of Armes.134 Hagan concludes that
Adolphus’ chief contribution was in the formal division between
types of courts-martial and their processes for fact-finding and
adjudication of guilt and punishment; that it was “an improvement
over previous codes, but it was more of a refinement rather than
dramatic departure.”135
Whether Adolphus was original or whether he was influenced
by some earlier Roman, French, Swedish, and even English models,
is a point of scholarly contention but not particularly important for
the study of the Code’s impacts. It is merely important to see what
the 1621 code represents. It is evidence of an increasingly
formalized and sophisticated catalogue of prohibitions, rules, and
processes; a catalogue backed by and promulgated under the
authority of the sovereign; one that imposes responsibilities on
commanders and duties on soldiers; one that is applicable to a
defined and wholly separate population of citizens; one that is
applicable to that group only when serving in a specific function –
that is, as members of the national military; and one regulating
conduct that would have detrimental consequences for the
sovereign’s ability to command and control forces over increasingly
larger scales of time and geography, and thereby increasing risk of
mission failure if not deterred. All of this was for the purpose of
enabling better management and use of force through more
disciplined, obedient, and loyal Forces.

D. Great Britain as Parent and Surrogate
The 1765 British Articles of War reflect this evolution and are
an important historical reference for they were copied nearly
verbatim by the Continental Congress in 1775 at the outset of the

132. Id. at 181.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 188-89.
135. Id. at 194, 198.
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Revolutionary War.136 The British Articles stated their purpose
simply: “for the better government of His Majesty’s Forces,” and
through the oath required of each fact-finding member, identified
the sources of military law: Acts of Parliament; conscience and
understanding of the individual commander; and customs of war
(Section XV, Article VI).137 It further imposed a duty on officers:
“Every officer commanding in quarters, garrison, or on the march,
shall keep good order, and to the utmost of his power redress all
such abuses or disorders which may be committed by any officer or
soldier under his command” (Section IX, Article V).138 It is not
immediately obvious what an “abuse” or disorder” might be, but we
can deduce it from context. Per Section XI, Article I, if a soldier or
officer is accused of a “capital crime or having used violence, or
committed any offense against the person or property of our subjects
such as is punishable by the known laws of the land,” the accused’s
commander will “use his utmost endeavors to deliver over such
accused person or persons to the civil magistrate and likewise to be
aiding and assisting to the officers of justice, in apprehending and
securing the person or persons so accused, in order to bring them to
trial.”139 In other words, “abuses and disorders” were only militaryspecific offenses committed outside the boundaries and
requirements of civil criminal laws. If a soldier murdered or raped
or defrauded a civilian, they were to be investigated and tried and
punished by the civilian system.140 One exception, beginning in
136. For a complete reprint of the 1765 Articles and the 1775 Continental
Congress Articles of War, see WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 931, 955; ROLLIN A.
IVES, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW AND THE JURISDICTION, CONSTITUTION,
AND PROCEDURE OF MILITARY COURTS 17 (1879).
137. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 942.
138. Id. at 937.
139. Id.
140. In Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 443 (1987), the Court referred
to the 1775 British Articles of War, (specifically, Section XIV, Art XVI –
“malicious destruction” of [private] civilian property) as evidence that the
original meaning of the American Articles of War included the trial of service
members for civilian-type offenses by military court-martial. This went to
support the Court’s argument that a military nexus test (of the criminal act) for
UCMJ jurisdiction is unworkable and ahistorical, in favor of service statusbased personal jurisdiction for the UCMJ. However, this is a shallow reading of
the early Code: the offense’s act element had a specific purpose: destruction of
private civilian property to “annoy rebels or other Enemies in Arms against us.”
To annoy rebels or other enemies is tactical purpose or goal in using that force
– as such, it most certainly is a military service-connected offense, not merely a
civilian common law offense. As Clode described this subject matter
jurisdictional limit, it began in the 1717 Articles of War (Article 18), which
mandated that commanders give up their soldier to civil magistrate for trial for
any offense not “created by Articles of War.” In 1718, Parliament reinforced this
mandate in an amendment to the Mutiny Act by making a commander’s failure
to turn in the accused to the civilian authorities an offense subject to
punishment of being cashiered from the Service “for neglect or refusal.”
Moreover, Parliament dictated that a civilian conviction foreclosed any
subsequent court-martial for the same offense. CLODE, supra note 81, at 54.

2021]

Martial Misconduct and Weak Defenses

891

1718, was when a non-military offense was committed by a soldier
stationed or fighting in foreign territory where access to English
civil courts was denied.141 The other exception was when a soldier’s
otherwise-civilian misdeeds bore a strong relationship to martial
conduct.142
The Articles prohibited, for example, conduct not otherwise
listed if it was prejudicial to good order and discipline (Section XX,
Article III), “behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner, such as is
unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentlemen” (Section
XV, Article XXIII), and a court-martial was free to try civilian
common law offenses when no British civilian jurisdiction existed
abroad (Section XX, Article II).143 As with the early modern codes
before it, like that of Adolphus, British courts-martial were not
monolithic: they held tiered courts based on the rank of the
commander convening them (and based in part on the kind of
command held, like a field command versus a post or camp) (see
Section XV, Articles XII, XIII, and XIV).144

III. SOME GENERALIZATIONS ON CONTINUITY
To get a sense of the continuity between the Old World’s
version of modern military justice and the New World’s, attention
should be given to what was considered worthy of criminalizing,
considered important for due process, and considered important
enough to impose on commanders across the countries and
generations. In all three of these areas, similarities abound among
the 1621 Articles of Gustavus Adolphus, the British Army prior to
the American Revolution, and the nascent Continental Army under
George Washington. In terms of misconduct, all three criminalized
falling asleep while on watch or guard duty, mutiny, striking a
superior officer, desertion, AWOL, dereliction of duty, dueling,
provoking speech or gestures, aiding the enemy, and acts or
omissions that prejudice good order and discipline. All three
established a tiered system of courts for fact-finding and adjudging
punishments: for more significant or grave crimes, the higher the
rank of the commander who convened and oversaw the trial, and a
correspondingly wider range of potential punishments.145 All three
imposed on the commander a duty to accurately report personnel

141. In 1813, Parliament extended a military commander’s extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction over his soldiers to any offense in which the purported
victim was an inhabitant or resident of that foreign country. CLODE, supra note
81, at 54-55.
142. Id.
143. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 946.
144. Id. at 943-44.
145. WINTHROP, supra note 10. From Gustavus Adolphus (1621): Articles
137-142, 150-157; from the British (1765): Section XV, esp. Articles V and XII;
from the American colonialist (1775): Articles XXXIII – XXXIX.
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strength and accountability.146
But these specific parallels are less interesting than the
broader themes that can be traced over time. Though there were of
course differences in wording and structure, by the time we get to
1775, we can make the following general, wavetop observations
about military codes of justice (at least those that bear on the
evolution of American military law), from Antiquity through the
Age of Enlightenment:
The sovereign government (of whatever form) recognized a need to
regulate behavior of those serving as soldiers, separate from criminal
law, as a means to achieve a larger strategic purpose: national
security and defense through better, more disciplined fighting, by
better, more disciplined soldiers
Changes to military “law” seem to occur as functions of changes in the
character of warfare – who fights, where they fight, how they fight
Systems of military justice articulated by these early “Articles of War”
shared certain characteristics:
They identified and set aside certain conduct as “criminal,” subject to
certain punishments, scalable to the gravity of the offense
They established some form of stable, recurring procedure to
formalize and make routine the investigation, prosecution, and
punishment of those crimes
They created a separate adjudicative body or tribunal that would
determine what happened and, if a crime, whether and how to punish
the offender
The enumerated offenses all had a certain character themselves:
while performing some type of military duty, position, or role, the
person did some act (or failed to some act) having a direct linkage to
and negative effect on military operations, other military personnel,
his own ability to perform his military duties, and/or the ability of the
commander to sustain well-ordered ranks in preparing for or
executing combat
The Articles recognized that some behavior should be criminalized
and punished simply because it prejudices good order and discipline,
or dishonors or scandalizes an officer (even if not enumerated in the
code, and even if not considered criminal at all if committed by
civilians)
They imposed managerial obligations on commanders and gave them
authoritative roles within the military justice system

Notwithstanding the marked differences in forms of
government and the philosophy of governing, sometimes this
continuity was, evidently, self-conscious and purposeful. “There
was,” John Adams wrote,
146. WINTHROP, supra note 10. From Gustavus Adolphus (1621): Articles
121, 130; from the British (1765): Section IV, Articles III - V; Section V, Articles
I – IV; from American colonialist (1775): Articles LVII – LIX, LXII, LXIII.
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extant one system of articles of war which had carried two empires to
the head of mankind, the Roman and the British; for the British
articles of war were only a literal translation of the Roman. It would
be vain for us to seek in our own inventions, or the records of warlike
nations, for a more complete system of military discipline . . . I was,
therefore, for reporting the British articles of war, totidem verbis.147

The history of the structure of American military justice from
the founding to the First World War is rich but fairly stable.148 It is
sufficient to note that after the Articles of War were revised in 1806
by Congress, they were not substantially revised again for more
than a century.149 This is remarkable in light of the country’s
repeated use of the military and its cyclical expansion and
contraction during at least five major wars. One commentator noted
acerbically that military historians and military lawyers took some
sort of perverse pride in so little changing in military law from
generation to generation, country to country, war to war.150
This source of pride in military law’s “ancient lineage” was
even more remarkable for it stood in conflict with how the Supreme
Court understood and characterized military law – contrasted
against what the military lawyers were saying, the Court’s view was
quite progressive. For the Court, across generations, military law
was simply another version of jurisprudence, one in which
constitutional rights and protections were applicable and in which
its fact-finding and punishing tribunals were, like other civilian
courts, “judicial” in nature.151 None of those cases, however,
suggested wholesale reform of the Articles of War was necessary,
nor that its provisions (like the absence of direct appellate review,
or the enormous influence of the accused’s commander over the type
of court and even its outcome) were violating soldiers’ rights and
liberties. Suffice it to say that it was not until the beginning of
World War I that the public, and many within the services
themselves, began to question the historical practice of courtsmartial with their limited role for lawyers, abbreviated versions of
147. 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 68 (1851). Adams noted that disciplining the
army, then under the command of General Washington, was a “very difficult
and unpopular subject” but one that needed to be addressed and resolved
according to Washington himself. Id.
148. For more on this subject and timeframe, see BRAY, supra note 10, and
Schlueter, supra note 10.
149. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR, COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NEW
ARTICLES OF WAR WITH THE PRESENT ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER RELATED
STATUTES (1912) (Letter from Major General Enoch Crowder, Army Judge
Advocate
General,
to
Henry
Stimson
Secretary
of
War),
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/new_articles_war.html
[perma.cc/2N5YMKGC] (outlining intent and scope of proposed changes and summarizing each
enactment of the U.S. Articles of War, and their revisions and amendments,
between 1775 and 1912).
150. S.T Ansell, Some Reforms in our System of Military Justice, 32 YALE
L.J. 146, 146-47 (1922).
151. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018).
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due process, and central roles and wide discretionary authority of
commanders.152 By that point, even conventional military justice’s
strongest advocates, including the Judge Advocate General
testifying before Congress in 1912, admitted that the American
Articles of War were “archaic,” and that even the British – whose
code served as the model since 1775 – annually amended its own
Articles of War to the point that they were now an unrecognizable
descendant of the code the Continental Congress adopted on
grounds of hasty expediency during the emergency of a war, one
that had not changed in substance in more than a century.153

IV. DISCONTENTS AND THE DEMILITARIZATION OF
MILITARY LAW
A. Law to “Startle and Perplex the American Lawyer”
At least by the early decades of the Twentieth Century,
American military law was broadly exceptional. By “broad,” it
characterized itself as more than simply a system of statutes and
courtrooms. By “exceptional,” it viewed itself as excepted from the
conventional norms and rules of civilian law, as if it were a distinct
theological body of self-regulating clerics. Especially in or around a
time of war, its proponents felt it must aggressively address and
decisively deter behavior that soldiers could have engaged in with
impunity as civilians; it was purposefully incomparable to any other
system of criminal justice and what was taken for granted as
fundamental or essential in those systems could be simply ignored.
If the cooks broke some eggs in the process, well, the risk was
foreseeable and consequences acceptable: one senior judge advocate,
152. The Injustice of Army Justice, LITERARY DIG. 13 (Apr. 12, 1919);
Edmund M. Morgan, The Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army
Articles, 29 Yale L.J. 52, 58-59 (1919). G. Norman Lieber, then professor of law
at West Point and son of Francis Lieber (of Lieber Code, General Order no. 100
fame), wrote in 1879 about the duties expected of a judge advocate in his
prosecutorial role (combined as it was with his role as “clerk to the court” and
“legal advisor to the court”). He recognized that military law at the time had no
interest in recognizing conventional due process protections afforded to civilian
defendants, and so he warned fellow judge advocates (and those who would
prosecute, who in all probability were not lawyers) to act “with good faith”
toward the rights of the accused, “never seeking to gain an undue advantage by
reason of any ignorance either of law or fact on the part of the accused; and
remembering that the government never desires, and that it can reflect no
credit on him, to secure a conviction in the teeth of facts. ‘Put yourself in his
place,’ is a maxim which might be suggestive to the judge-advocate of the course
he should pursue.” Lieber, supra note 152, at vi. Of course, this “maxim” was
only “suggestive,” found only in a preface to a legal treatise used primarily for
teaching West Point cadets, was not demanded by a regulation from the War
Department in the Manual for Courts-Martial, nor codified by Congress in the
Articles of War.
153. Ansell, supra note 150, at 147-48.
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writing not long after World War I, observed dryly:
It was to be expected that the unusual experiences of the World War,
wherein upwards of 200,000 new officers were commissioned in the
service, necessarily with brief training, and nearly 4,000,000 men
were suddenly called into the army, would develop some defects in
the system of administering military justice.154

At best, U.S. military law considered those other systems (of
American justice) about as relevant to its development and
structure as intellectual property law is to that of civil rights law.
Some, like Professor Wigmore in 1919 (himself briefly a former
judge advocate officer) went even further when he was Dean of
Northwestern’s Law School: not only was military law exceptional
and broad, but its exceptional characteristics (that made it so
“efficient”) made it worthy of emulation by civilian jurisdictions
which seemed, to Wigmore, incapable of identifying a primary
purpose for criminal law and incapable of centralizing its
administration.155 For such critics, it was not military law that
needed reform by way of civilianization; it was civilian law that
needed – in a sense – to be militarized (or at least stay out of the
way of military justice and its proponents).
Not all were so sanguine, let alone enthusiastic cheerleaders
for the military justice system’s exceptionalism in the years during
and after the First World War. Then-Yale law professor Edmund
Morgan (three decades before he led the drafting of the first UCMJ)
observed that “analogies to the American system of administering
criminal justice in the civil courts would serve only to mislead” and
that the notable differences ought to “startle and perplex the
American lawyer” not inspire civil court mimicking of the
centralized court-martial system.156 “No member of the court need
be learned in the law or skilled in the investigation of facts,” and
that went for the “legal advisor” to the court (who also served as
prosecutor and was usually a “line officer of comparatively low
rank”) and the defense counsel.157 The system’s indulgence for
“hasty or ill-guarded action by officers exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction” led to real cases of apparent irrational punitive
injustice.158 In one such case, Morgan notes, a soldier was sentenced
to three months confinement for stealing condensed milk worth
fourteen cents; another in which a soldier was sentenced to a
dishonorable discharge and a year in prison for taking a little over
three dollars from a pair of pants hanging on a wall, despite (while
“conscience-stricken”) returning the money within minutes; and a
154. William C. Rigby, Military Penal Law: A Brief Survey of the 1920
Revision of the Articles of War, 12 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 84, 87 (1922).
155. John H. Wigmore, Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to be Learned from
Military Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1919).
156. Morgan, supra note 152, at 58-59.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 54.
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third in which a soldier was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison
for refusing to obey his sergeant’s order to remove a bow tie and
using “foul and abusive language” against that same sergeant when
arrested for the disobedience.159 In a telling illustration of the
meaning of “appellate review” at the time, his quarter-century
sentence was mercifully reduced to a mere decade by the
commanding general.160 In the wake of the First World War, such
grossly undeserving punishments in a system in which the normal
constitutional rights of the accused were absent (like representation
by a qualified lawyer as defense counsel) earned ridicule in the
public domain:
The Buffalo Evening News finds the Army law system “archaic” and
“pitilessly cruel” in many cases. Observing that “there is sometimes
justice in a court-martial, but it is purely accidental,” The
Washington Post calls the system “hideous,” while the proAdministration New York World characterizes it as “lynch law for the
Army.” Even tho [sic] some of the stories of injustice may be distorted
or exaggerated, the Newark News, generally friendly to the
Administration and the Secretary of War, finds it clear enough that
the system “is out of date and needs to be reformed.” . . . The Brooklyn
Eagle [was disturbed] “by the revelations of the grotesque ignoring of
rights of private soldiers.”161

The American military’s criminal law necessarily included
statutes promulgated by Congress under its Article I, section 8,
clause 14 authority162 (like the Articles of War163 and Articles for
the Government of the Navy164), legal precedents from certain
courts, but also regulations issued by the president pursuant to a
statute or in accordance with a Congressional grant of power under
his “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” responsibility.165
Military law also included regulations issued by the president under
his “commander in chief” role, as well as orders from the president
or secretary of war issued to administer the military organization
and employment of force.166 Such regulations and orders were
considered the functional equivalent of binding law for those with
this “sphere of [presidential] authority.”167 Orders from higher
159. Id. at 55, n.14.
160. Id.
161. Injustice, supra note 152, at 13.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
163. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 787, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593.
164. Act of April 2, 1918, 40 Stat. 501.
165. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
166. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 27.
167. EDGAR S. DUDLEY, MILITARY LAW AND THE PROCEDURE OF COURTSMARTIAL 8 (1907) (Colonel Dudley, a judge advocate, was serving as a Professor
of Law at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point when he published this book.
He intended this 650-page tome to serve several audiences: for “practical use”
by lawyers and commanders in the field, and as a “textbook” with a “clear and
thorough outline of the science of military law . . . to be contained within such
brief compass as to be adapted for use in the instruction of Cadets within the
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uniformed commanders to subordinates were also considered
effectively “law,” the violation of which would expose servicemembers to criminal liability and punishment.168
But even more than these doctrinal – or at least authoritative
– sources of commands and prohibitions, military law encompassed
the “customs and usages of the service derived from immemorial
usage in time of peace or war.”169 Provided that the customs were
“long, unquestioned, and continuous,” they served as evidence of
how to construe otherwise ambiguous rules, policies, and
regulations.170 This kind of unwritten legal precedent, lex non
scripta, served as a gap-filler when the meaning of case law,
regulations, orders, or statutes was in doubt.
These sources of authority remain, even today, the
components of military law.171 Even custom and usages of the
service remain explicitly embedded within the rules of American
military justice. “Custom” helps define the roles and responsibilities
of military prosecutors and defense counsel;172 helps establish when
an officer’s order to a subordinate is enforceable under the color of
law;173 helps establish a “duty,” the breach of which subjects a
service-member to the criminal charge of “dereliction of duty;”174
helps explain why certain conduct between leaders, having a
“special trust,” and trainees or recruits is criminalizable;175 helps
explain what dishonorable conduct while held captive by the enemy
is punishable;176 helps explain why “fraternization” between officers

limited period assigned to the study of the subject”). If any of my fellow
Department of Law faculty assigned a 650-page book on this subject to cadets
today, they may very well find themselves victims of a cadet-led mutiny, assault,
disobedience, or other misconduct described in that very book.
168. Id. at 5-9.
169. Id. at 10.
170. Id. at 5-9; Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 35-36 (1827); IVES, supra note
136, at 21.
171. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 31, at Part I (Preamble),
para. 3.
172. 10 U.S.C. § 838 (Art. 38, UCMJ); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra
note 31, at Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 502(d), at II-53 to II-54.
173. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 31, at Part IV, para.
16.c.(1)-(2) (explaining the elements of Article 90, UCMJ, “Willfully disobeying
superior commissioned officer”).
174. Id. at para. 18.c.(3)(a) & (b) (explaining the elements of Article 92,
UCMJ, “Failure to obey order or regulation,” which includes being “derelict in
the performance of duties”).
175. Id. at para. 20.c.(1) (“The prevention of inappropriate sexual activity by
trainers, recruiters, and drill instructors with recruits, trainees, students
attending service academies, and other potentially vulnerable persons in the
initial training environment is crucial to the maintenance of good order and
military discipline. Military law, regulation, and custom invest officers, noncommissioned officers, drill instructors, recruiters, cadre, and others with the
right and obligation to exercise control over those they supervise.”).
176. Id. at para. 26.c.(3)(a).
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and enlisted personnel is a potential crime;177 and most notably
justifies the charging, prosecution, and punishment of behavior that
is not otherwise an enumerated offense under the UCMJ, would
otherwise be constitutionally protected, but would be “prejudicial to
good order and discipline” under the circumstances:
In its legal sense, “custom” means more than a method of procedure
or a mode of conduct or behavior which is merely of frequent or usual
occurrence. Custom arises out of long established practices which by
common usage have attained the force of law in the military or other
community affected by them. No custom may be contrary to existing
law or regulation. A custom which has not been adopted by existing
statute or regulation ceases to exist when its observance has been
generally abandoned.178

Despite these similarities between American military law of
past and present, few scholars, lawyers, or military leaders preWorld War I would have conceived of the military’s judicial system
as a “judicial system” at all – or at least not one connected to (let
alone subservient to) a civilian justice process. General William
Tecumseh Sherman, ironically a lawyer himself, wrote a decade and
half after the Civil War:
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being in a
community all the liberty, security, and happiness possible,
consistent with the safety of all. The object of military law is to govern
armies composed of strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the
largest measure of force at the will of the nation. These objects are as
wide apart as the poles, and each requires its own separate system of
laws, statute and common.179

At the time, this was the same view held by esteemed judge
advocates, including the Army’s Judge Advocate General: “military
law is founded on the idea of a departure from civil law, and it seems
to me a grave error to suffer it to become a sacrifice to principles of
civil jurisprudence at variance with its object.”180 Courts-martial
were thought, by the practitioners, to be definitively “not part of the
judicial system of the United States” and their decisions of guilt and
sentencing were not reviewed by civilian appellate courts (except
insofar as to judge whether the court-martial had proper personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction, or whether the sentence exceeded
the court’s authority).181 Because they were temporary and solely
derived from orders of the commander who convened the tribunal,
they were not courts of record.
Nevertheless, they were still lawful tribunals exercising the
gift of plenary authority over all military offenses. As such, they

177. Id. at para. 101.c.(1).
178. Id. at para. 91.c.(2)(b).
179. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, MILITARY LAW 296 (1880).
180. Lieber, supra note 152.
181. Id.
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were considered more like courts of honor, especially when trying
officers for conduct unbecoming conduct or enlisted soldiers of
conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. Military discipline
and justice, though undoubtedly derived from constitutional powers
of the Congress and president, existed in practice outside the
stream of constitutional commerce – that is, its norms, prohibitions,
liberties, and protections were ineluctably unsuitable and largely
irrelevant. What was suitable and relevant, however, were the
specific rules and articles promulgated by Congress, commanders,
and the president, individual leaders’ consciences, and the customs
of war.182

B. “An Organism Provided by Law”
Importantly and undeniably, the practitioner’s (be it the judge
advocate’s or commander’s) view of military justice at the turn of
the twentieth century should be viewed as at odds with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s own view. In 1879, the same year General
Sherman intellectually segregated civil from military law based on
their principles, purposes, and procedures, the Court in Ex Parte
Reed183 said that a court-martial was an:
organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering
justice in this class of cases . . . Its judgments, when approved as
required, rest on the same basis and are surrounded by the same
considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other
legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest, under like
circumstances.184

A few years later, notwithstanding the military’s purpose and
singular methodology of gaining service members’ compliance, and
that a “court-martial organized under the law of the United States
is a court of special and limited jurisdiction . . . called into existence
for a special purpose, and to perform a particular duty,” the Court
noted that:
the whole proceeding, from its inception, is judicial. The trial, finding,
and sentence are the solemn acts of a court organized and conducted
under the authority of and according to the prescribed forms of law.
It sits to pass upon the most sacred questions of human rights that
are ever placed on trial in a court of justice – rights which, in the very
nature of things, can neither be exposed to danger nor subjected to
the uncontrolled will of any man, but which must be adjudged
according to law.185

Of course, the Court in Runkle v. United States186 was only
182. DUDLEY, supra note 167, at 13-15; WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 49-50.
183. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
184. Id. at 23.
185. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 558 (1887).
186. Id.
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speaking of the president’s statutory requirement to approve, with
judicial-like authority, certain kinds of courts-martial sentences
(dismissal of an officer in peacetime) and was in fact quoting a
formal opinion of Attorney General Bates’ to President Lincoln. The
Court was not commenting on, nor judging the appropriateness or
constitutionality of any procedural element of the trial or the system
that convicted Major Runkle in the first place. But the Court’s
(adopting the Attorney General’s) description is telling. The Court
characterized the “whole proceeding” as “judicial,” not a mere
executive branch administrative employment decision.187 It
confirmed the court-martial – the entire military justice system –
as within the range of the conventional civil due process norms, the
meaning of the rule of law, and – at least – “the spirit of American
institutions.”188
It is difficult – if not impossible – to square the high court’s
description with that of General Sherman and the judge advocates
of the period who viewed the systems as “diametrically opposed,
foes”189 with the military’s nature and its objective justifying a
wholly distinctive method for dealing with misconduct. The latter
view was particularly galling to many reform-minded lawyers
within the military in light of an opinion nearly twenty years after
Runkle. In Grafton v. United States,190 the Court held that a prior
court-martial acquittal (the charge against Private Homer Grafton
was the murder of a Filipino civilian while serving as a sentry on
duty in the Philippines) barred subsequent trial for the same offense
in a civilian criminal court. That is, the U.S. Constitution’s double
jeopardy protection applied.191 The Court held that a trial by courtmartial under the Articles of War (promulgated as a federal statute
by the Congress) is – at least for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment’s protection – the equal to a federal criminal
prosecution under the law of the United States (which, at the time,
was the law of Philippines under U.S. occupation).192 The Court
noted:
It is indisputable that, if a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an
officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality
and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the
judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take
cognizance.193

The Court then quoted at length the colorful, and powerful,
187. Id.
188. S.T. Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1919), reprinted in MIL.
L. REV. BICENT. ISS. 61 (1975).
189. LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, The Room Where It Happens, in HAMILTON (Act
2) (Jeffrey Seller 2015).
190. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
191. Id. at 352-55.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 345.
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metaphor made twenty-seven years earlier in Ex Parte Reed: “an
organism . . . clothed with the duty of administering justice.”194

C. Ansell’s Arguments for Reform
Samuel T. Ansell, the Acting Judge Advocate General of the
Army during World War I, was an outspoken and influential critic
of the very military justice system he helped manage.195 A West
Point alumnus and former infantry officer, Ansell was graduate of
the University of North Carolina’s law school (1904), and served
subsequent tours as a judge advocate, including two stints as an
instructor at West Point’s Department of Law.196 Later in his career,
serving at the War Department and the office of the Judge Advocate
General, he viewed these Supreme Court precedents as
contradicting – rightly so – the uniformed apologists for a military
justice system that was “not exactly congenial to justice [for] the
militaristic mind is rather intolerant of those methods and
processes necessary to justice.”197 His criticisms were public,
abrasive, and full of “noble sentiments” but – to many within the
bureaucracy – “demonstrated little personal restraint or tact.”198
Brigadier General Ansell’s unrestrained criticism marked the
beginning of the first major public (and intra-governmental)
controversy over the fundamental characteristics of American
military justice. Now known as the Ansell-Crowder Controversy (or
Dispute),199 Ansell’s legal positions and his vocal and repeated
recommendations to reform the Articles of War were opposed by his
boss, the actual Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major
General Enoch Crowder. Crowder was also a West Point graduate,
a contemporary of John J. Pershing, with troop-leading experience
in the 1880s in Texas and against the Sioux Indians in the Dakota
Territory (and earning his law degree from the University of
Missouri200). Later earning a reputation for skillful and
194. Id. at 346.
195. See generally Fred L. Borch, Military Justice in Turmoil: The AnsellCrowder Controversy of 1917-1920, 2018 ARMY LAW. 40 (2018).
196. While researching for this article, assigned as an Assistant Professor of
Law at West Point, I came across a rare treasure: a hardcopy first edition of
DUDLEY, supra note 167: it bears the handwritten signature of the book’s owner
or – at least – its chief reader, on one of the first blank pages: “Ansell,” written
in pencil, in script at the top of the page. Dudley specifically thanked one
Lieutenant Ansell, a fellow instructor in the Department of Law, for his edits
and “revisions” to the draft that book. The volume was tucked away, unnoticed
and non-descript, on a low shelf in the department’s soon-to-be-antiquated law
library.
197. Ansell, supra note 150, at 63.
198. GENEROUS, supra note 10, at 9 (referring to Ansell’s tactics as “probably
counterproductive”).
199. Borch, supra note 195, at 40.
200. Crowder originally studied law on his own time while stationed in
Texas. There was no law school, but rather he earned his license to practice
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knowledgeable lawyering in the Philippines during the Insurrection
(1899-1902), he developed close ties with General Arthur
MacArthur (father to later General Douglas MacArthur), the
Military Governor of the Philippines, and William Howard Taft,
President McKinley’s civilian representative in the islands. Taft,
thereafter as Secretary of War and President, continued to support
Crowder and continued to be a surrogate advocate for Crowder’s
views on military justice even after Taft left office and before his
confirmation as the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice.201 Crowder
impressed his superiors quickly, tasked with not only serving as
legal advisor to the commanding general but also appointed to be
an associate justice on the Philippine Supreme Court – where he
also found time to write the government’s code of criminal
procedure.202
After his assignment to the Philippines, Crowder – by then
promoted to Major – returned to Washington where he served as the
Army’s Deputy Judge Advocate General.203 In 1903, Secretary of
War Elihu Root appointed up-and-coming Major Crowder to study
the effects of pending legislation intended to reorganize elements of
the War Department as well as possible uses for the newly
established National Guard.204 Impressing yet another senior
civilian official with his diligence and aptitude, Root sent Crowder
as an observer to the Russo-Japanese War.205 According to Legal
Historian Joshua Kastenberg, “the importance of this duty cannot
be overstated,” for it was this experience – watching the first
modern war of such a scale between technologically-matched
adversaries – that convinced Crowder of the valuable role that rigid
discipline, imposed via a legal code, plays in securing battlefield
success against capable enemies under the harshest of combat
conditions.206 Upon returning, then-Secretary of War Taft assigned
Crowder to Cuba, where he spent almost three years.207 In 1911,
then-President Taft nominated Crowder as the Judge Advocate

after demonstrating his knowledge and competence to a local judge on a written
examination. Thus, strongly to modern eyes, he was a licensed attorney before
he even began his studies in law at the University of Missouri. KASTENBERG,
supra note 10, at 13-14. Crowder was assigned to Jefferson Barracks at the time
and lobbied the Judge Advocate General Department for a transfer to Columbia,
Missouri, so that he could enroll in the law school – they permitted this, while
assigning him to the concurrent duty of Professor of Military Science for the
university’s ROTC program. Fred L. Borch, The Greatest Judge Advocate in
History? The Extraordinary Life of Major General Enoch H. Crowder (1859–
1932), ARMY LAW. (May 2012), at 1.
201. KASTENBERG, supra note 10, at 16.
202. Id.
203. Borch, supra note 200, at 3.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Kastenberg, supra note 10, at 18.
207. Borch, supra note 200, at 3.
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General of the Army.208 Beginning in 1914, he began sending select
line officers to well-regarded law schools, and in 1916 began
recruiting law professors – including John Wigmore (then Dean of
Northwestern University’s law school) and Felix Frankfurter (then
of Harvard, and later of the U.S. Supreme Court) – to serve in the
War Department as reserve Judge Advocates.209 In 1916, after four
years of development, Crowder’s revisions to the Articles of War (the
latest being from 1874, but substantially the same as those of 1806)
were enacted by Congress.210
The debate or controversy over the state of the nation’s military
justice system under the 1916 Articles of War began in early 1917
when President Wilson appointed Crowder to the additional duty of
Provost Marshal, in charge of running the country’s conscription
under the new Selective Service program.211 Crowder was by then
entangled in several quasi-personal, quasi-professional dilemmas.
Passionately, he pleaded to Secretary of War Newton Baker for the
opportunity to leave Washington and take command of a unit
heading off to fight in France and Germany.212 Due to his outsize
bureaucratic influence and his ample administrative and legal
abilities, his pleas were dismissed with the proverbial “you’re just
too important to us back here” determination that so rattles staff
officers when war comes calling.213 Reinforcing his bitterness at the
rejection for field command, Crowder also faced a Chief of Staff of
the Army (General Peyton March) who constantly sought to bring
the independent Judge Advocate General Department under the
direct control and authority of his office.214 Crowder successfully,
albeit against an antagonistic superior general officer, convinced
Secretary of War Baker to leave the Department outside the
military chain-of-command so as to allow the professional lawyers
to provide unfiltered and timely legal counsel to the War
Department’s leadership.215 Professor Kastenberg observes that
“Crowder sought to preserve the profession of law for legal experts,
arguing that just as the army would not send an infantry officer to
supervise a bridge construction, which was essentially an engineer’s
duty, it should not permit a nonlawyer to command the army’s legal
office.”216
This advocacy for the judge advocates is ironic in light of the
controversy that soon erupted within his staff and spilled into
Congress, capturing the public’s attention.217 Crowder was arguing
208. Id.
209. Kastenberg, supra note 10, at 20.
210. Act of August 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 619 (1916).
211. Kastenberg, supra note 10, at 23-25.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Borch, supra note 195, at 40.
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that the professional experts’ legal training and knowledge were so
critical and so technical that they must be institutionally detached
from the imprimatur and pressure of command influence. It is a
highly ironic argument because that was largely the claim of Ansell
and his small band of fellow reform advocates but on a more tactical
scale – that of the individual court-martial. Yet to Crowder, Ansell’s
suggestions were “radical” in the extreme.218
When Crowder took on the additional duty of running the
draft, he appointed then-Lieutenant Colonel Ansell to the position
of Acting Judge Advocate General, along with a brevet promotion to
Brigadier General.219 Ansell’s task was to provide wartime legal
advice to the leadership of the War Department, manage a military
justice system that would conduct 31,000 general courts-martial
and more than 300,000 special and summary court-martial in two
and half years, and oversee the expansion of the Judge Advocate
Department (which ballooned from a pre-War size of dozen to more
than 400).220 Ansell’s primary, but by no means only, concern about
military justice was the lack of meaningful appellate review of
convictions and sentences.221 At the time, the Articles of War
provided for no regular panel of appellate judges to review
allegations of legal error, factual insufficiency of the evidence, or
prosecutorial misconduct, or to provide judicial remedies to soldiers
prejudiced by those errors and due process abuses.222 Instead, the
convictions and sentences were reviewed and approved by the courtmartial appointing authority (now known as the “convening
authority”), who was typically the commanding general of the unit
in which the accused served.223 The records of trial were then simply
forwarded to the Office of the Judge Advocate General for review
and “to revise” the record; under certain conditions, the records
were sent to the Secretary of War or President for review, approval,
or clemency actions.224
Four American courts-martial conducted in the field in
France drew Ansell’s swift rebuke and triggered debate over a courtmartial’s structural fairness at the highest levels of the War
Department.225 In April 1918, Ansell’s department reviewed four
death sentences and their records of trial that totaled four sheets of
218. Id.
219. KASTENBERG, supra note 10, at 3-4.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Morgan, supra note 152, at 71-72.
223. Id.
224. Terry W. Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of
General Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1967). The authority was
Section 1199 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 (Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 458, sec.
2, 18 Stat. 244).
225. Statement of Samuel T. Ansell—Resumed, Before the United States
Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, “Establishment of Military Justice”—
Proposed Amendment of the Articles of War (Aug. 26, 1919), at 134-35.

2021]

Martial Misconduct and Weak Defenses

905

paper. The accused soldiers were all privates, all volunteers, and all
eighteen or nineteen years old.226 Two were court-martialed for
sleeping while on post on the front line, ostensibly observing the
deadly “non man’s land” between the belligerent’s trench lines of
machine gun nests and barbed wire.227 They had been on this duty
for seven consecutive days and nights, each one alternating sleep
one hour at a time.228 The total time it took for the court to hear the
cases and sentence them to death was one hour and forty-five
minutes.229 Eventually, it took intercessions by Crowder and Baker,
and pardons by the president, to prevent their execution.230 The
other two privates were prosecuted for disobeying an order to get
their equipment and go to drill.231 They pled guilty, but then made
statements that were inconsistent with an acknowledgment of
culpability: they said they were just too physically exhausted to
drill.232
This should have raised the issue of their incapacity to obey an
otherwise lawful order. Their defense counsel, a young non-lawyer
lieutenant, called one witness – their company commander, and
asked him a question about the defendant’s military history; to the
surprise of nobody, the captain testified: “Bad, very bad. One of the
worst in the country.”233 This sealed their fate. Under the Articles
of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, these death sentences
should have been forwarded directly to the Judge Advocate General
Department to pass on to President Wilson for confirmation.234
Instead, the records found themselves almost immediately in the
hands of General Pershing, the Commander of the American
Expeditionary Force in France and already a household name
among Americans.235 Pershing wrote a letter, inserted into the
packet, meant to “induce the President of the United States to
confirm these sentences of death” and asked for specific direction
from the president to carry out the sentences expeditiously: “I
recommend the execution of the sentences in all of these cases in
the belief that it is a military necessity and that it will diminish the
number of like cases that may arise in the future,” Pershing wrote
as if the judicial decision to execute upon the conviction of a capital
offense were the same thing as the use of swift and brutal force in
combat to deter enemy aggression.236 Ultimately, President Wilson
226. Id. at 135, 144.
227. Id. at 135.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 144.
230. Id. at 147-48.
231. Id. at 135.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 136.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 141 (quoting the verbatim text of General Pershing’s letter of
January 17, 1918).
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granted clemency to these two soldiers, commuting their sentences
to three years of confinement.237
Two large scale prosecutions, both domestic rather than
overseas in the theater of war, caught Ansell’s attention during this
time too, stoked his ire, and sparked immediate bureaucratic
confrontation. The fight was over the scope of the Judge Advocate
General’s authority and the extent to which it could contravene or
overrule decisions made by commanding officers with power
granted by the Articles of War.238 In 1917, about a dozen enlisted
soldiers (including non-commissioned officers) stationed at Fort
Bliss, in southwest Texas, were charged with “mutiny” because they
refused an officer’s order to attend required drill. While a seemingly
straightforward case of disobeying the chain-of-command, these
soldiers were already under arrest for various other minor
infractions. An Army regulation of the time provided that noncommissioned officers should not attend drill while under arrest.
The soldiers knew this when they disobeyed the order.
Nevertheless, they were prosecuted and convicted at courts-martial,
sentenced to dishonorable discharges and given terms of
confinement ranging from ten to twenty-five years. These cases
were reviewed, approved, and ordered executed, by the general
officer appointing authority. Dutifully, the records were forwarded
to the Office of the Judge Advocate General, where they came to
Ansell’s attention.239
Ansell interpreted his office’s legal authority to “revise”
broadly.240 Rather than simply correct superficial errors, Ansell
asserted that the language in the statute should be read as an
authority to set aside findings and sentences the Office found to be
unjust or prejudiced by legal error committed by the court or the
chain-of-command.241 This broad reading and assertion of binding
legal review was novel; it angered Crowder, who immediately wrote
to the Secretary of War that Ansell’s interpretation was wrong.242
While the senior Judge Advocate General Department
officers argued over this statutory interpretation of their own
authority, a second significant prosecution – actually, three related
prosecutions – came to Ansell’s attention. On August 23, 1917,
approximately one hundred Black infantrymen assigned to the 3d
Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, participated in what quickly
became known as the “Camp Logan Mutiny” or the “Houston Riots,”
leading to the largest court-martial for murder – in fact, the largest
murder trial in any American jurisdiction – in history.243
237. Id. at 147.
238. Borch, supra note 195, at 41.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Borch, supra note 195, at 41-42.
242. Id. at 41.
243. Fred L. Borch, “The Largest Murder Trial in the History of the United
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Several significant problems arose – all of which were perfectly
legal under the existing Articles of War. The 118 defendants were
prosecuted in three courts-martial, all defendants plead not guilty,
and all were represented by a single defense counsel.244 That
defense counsel, while experienced in some aspects of military
discipline and investigations (he was the division’s Inspector
General) and having formerly taught in West Point’s Law
Department, was not a trained lawyer.245 All defendants were
Black, while the court-martial panels and judges were all white.
Most significantly, the death sentence adjudged against thirteen of
these soldiers after the first trial (Nesbit) was carried out within
days of the verdict, well before the record of the trials were sent to
Washington, D.C. for review and before the Judge Advocate General
of the Army or the Secretary of War could make a recommendation
to the president to approve or disapprove that sentence.246 Under
the existing Articles, the general in command of the division who
convened the courts-martial was granted authority to impose that
sentence without presidential review only in times of war.247 The
alleged crimes (disobeying orders, mutiny, murder, and aggravated
assault) and the sentence all occurred in Texas, not a combat zone,
but the language of the statute did not account for such nuances; it
did not define “time of war,” and the convening authority used this
opportunity to exercise the utmost of his judicial powers as swiftly
as he could.248
The results of the trials, in which 110 of the 118 indicted
soldiers were found guilty and nineteen executed, enraged Ansell.249
States”: The Houston Riots Courts-Martial of 1917, 2011 ARMY LAW. 1 (2011).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2.
246. Statement of Samuel T. Ansell, supra note 225, at 131.
247. Id.
248. The courts-martial, in chronological order, were United States v.
Nesbit, General Court Martial Case no. 109045 (1917), United States v.
Washington, General Courts Martial Case no. 109018 (1917), and United States
v. Tillman, General Courts Martial Case no. 114575 (1917). This episode has
generated voluminous studies and books; for summaries of the events leading
up to and including the “riots,” and the trials, see James Robert Hawkins, How
Houston Citizens Started Bloody Riot, CHICAGO DEFENDER, at A9, Mar. 17, 1934
(a narrative account from one of the Regiment’s soldiers); JAIME SALIZAR &
GEOFFREY CORN, MUTINY OF RAGE: THE 1917 CAMP LOGAN RIOTS & BUFFALO
SOLDIERS IN HOUSTON (2021) (engaging with recently declassified documents);
ROBERT V. HAYNES, A NIGHT OF VIOLENCE: THE HOUSTON RIOT OF 1917 (1976);
Angela Armendariz Dorau, Of Soldiers, Racism, and Mutiny, The 1917 Camp
Logan Riot and Court Martial, 16 HERITAGE MAG. 6 (1998),
www.texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth45398/m1/6/ [perma.cc/P8HGVAA4]; for immediate reporting of the incident, see Army Riot at Houston Cost
17 Lives; Negro Troops Ordered Out of State; Congress Will Take Up Race
Question,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
25,
1917),
www.nytimes.com/1917/08/25/archives/army-riot-at-houston-cost-17-livesnegro-troops-ordered-out-of.html [perma.cc/E5QJ-QDD2].
249. Borch, supra note 195, at 42.
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He wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of War, sent through
Major General Crowder, criticizing Winthrop’s view of the courtmartial as a mere agency of the Executive Branch.250 He restated
that he interpreted existing law to permit the Judge Advocate
General to revise the outcomes of flawed courts-martial with
remedial actions to correct legal defects.251 He noted that it made no
sense for the Judge Advocate General to be able to declare a courtmartial null and void for lack of jurisdiction (an authority beyond
dispute) but not be able to meaningfully revise the proceedings for
errors that substantially prejudiced the convicted soldier.252
Crowder penned a rebuttal – an opposition brief. He wrote that
there was “no fundamental reason why court-martial jurisdictions,
as at present constituted, should be disturbed. War is an emergency
condition requiring a far more arbitrary control than peace. The
fittest field of application for our penal code is the camp.” The
“primary end” of military justice, he said, was discipline, so its
procedure “must be simple, informal and prompt.”253 Secretary
Baker replied at the end of December 1917 that he had read Ansell’s
brief as “based primarily on the necessity for, rather than the actual
existence of, the power of revision” and then inquired of Crowder
how far the power to revise could be extended by executive order or
whether such a change needed Congressional action.254
At his prodding, and with the agreement of Crowder, Secretary
of War Baker issued General Order no. 7 in January 1918.255 This
order prohibited the execution of any death sentence, or dismissal
of any officer, before the record was reviewed for legality by the
Office of the Judge Advocate General and the President had an
opportunity to make an informed decision on potential clemency or
commutation. To complete this task, and taking on an additional
duty of reviewing the records in “all serious general courts-martial,”
Ansell established what became “boards of review” made up of judge
advocates from his office – the first ever formal pseudo-“appellate”
process for American courts-martial. These reviews were advisory
only, but kick-started Ansell’s determined effort to dramatically
reform the Articles of War to make them – essentially – as close to
civilian criminal trials as practically feasible.256
Ansell’s efforts were aimed at several structural authorities
long encoded in the Articles of War and the Manual for CourtsMartial. If he had been successful, the changes would have been
250. Statement of Samuel T. Ansell, supra note 225, at 123.
251. Id. at 127-30.
252. Brown, supra note 224, at 6.
253. Id. at 7.
254. Id. Brown writes that this Order was meant to “forestall” Congressional
hearings by quieting the complaints of Ansell. Id. at 8.
255. United States Dep’t of War, General Order no. 7, Jan. 17, 1918.
256. Borch, supra note 195, at 42; Brown, supra note 224, at 9, n. 44.
Generous claims that Ansell was motivated, at least in part, by “ambition to
take over Crowder’s job.” GENEROUS, supra note 10, at 6.
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“revolutionary,”257 and thirty years ahead of their time.258 Ansell
thought that the Articles of War259 and Manual did not define the
crimes with sufficient particularity, leaving a fair notice problem for
the accused because their elements and modes of proof were only to
be found in the Manual for Courts-Martial, which is only an
Executive Order, subject to the discretionary revision of the
President rather than codified into a criminal penal law; nor were
there explicit penalties established for each offense by statute –
rather, many of the punishments were simply left to the discretion
of the court-martial itself.260 Even more of an assault on modern due
process norms, he felt, was the fact that charges would be referred
to a general court-martial without having first been screened for
evidentiary and prudential soundness in a preliminary
investigation where the accused could make a statement or present
exculpatory evidence.261 Moreover, charges were referred without a
lawyer first certifying in writing that such accusations were legally
sufficient with at least prima facie proof of guilt.262 This risked
arbitrarily drafted accusations of criminality, based on nothing
more than the possible caprice or pique of the commander.
Ansell also preferred that the Articles of War specify the
number of panel members for each type of court-martial (eight for a
general court-martial, three for a special) to prevent commanders
with appointing authority from changing the roster of the panel
mid-way through a trial;263 he also strongly favored permitting
enlisted soldiers to serve on panels, regardless of the rank of the
accused. He believed that conviction should require three-fourths of
the panel to agree, rather than the conventional requirement of only

257. Borch, supra note 195, at 43.
258. Brown, supra note 224, at 2, 44 (“if passed by Congress, [the Bill that
Ansell drafted based on these recommendations] would have given the United
States Army a code of military law in 1920 which would have closely paralleled,
and in some respects exceeded, the Uniform Code of Military Justice [enacted
in 1950]”).
259. Articles of War, 39 Stat. 659 (1916).
260. Id. Articles 58 (desertion), 64 (assaulting or willfully disobeying a
superior officer), 75 (misbehavior before the enemy), 96 (various crimes: e.g.,
common law offenses of rape, murder, mayhem, arson, robbery, embezzlement,
and perjury), 98 (general article – prejudicial to good order and discipline or
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service). See also
Revisions of the Articles of War, Subcommittee of the Committee on Military
Affairs, House of Representatives, 64th Cong. (1916) (Statement of Brigadier
General
Enoch
H.
Crowder,
July
29,
1916),
at
24,
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Hearing_subcomm.pdf [perma.cc/8EJGDN6J].
261. As Borch notes (supra note 195, at 43), the 1917 Manual for CourtsMartial did require this, but as such it was nothing more than a rule that could
be modified at the discretion of the president. UNITED STATES MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL 40-41 (1917) (para. 76).
262. Brown, supra note 224, at 18.
263. Id. at 21-22.

910

UIC Law Review

[54:867

two-thirds and wanted unanimity for a death sentence.264
Significantly, Ansell believed that each court-martial should have a
“court judge advocate” serving in a judge-like role to rule on motions
and questions of law, to summarize the evidence and applicable law
for the benefit of the panel, to review the finding for legal
sufficiency, and to impose the sentence.265 Reinforcing this
barricade of judicial independence at the trial level would be a new
reviewing authority he called a “Court of Military Appeals,” made
up of three civilian judges appointed by the president and confirmed
by the senate for life terms.266
A significant reason for Ansell’s unease with the mechanisms
of military justice can be found in the opening commentary to the
discussion of punishment in the 1917 Manual for Courts-Martial:
While courts-martial are the judicial machinery provided by law for
the trial of military offenses, the law also recognizes that the legal
power of command, when wisely and justly exercised to that end, is a
powerful agency for the maintenance of discipline.267

In December 1918, allied to Ansell, attention over the
character of military justice shifted into the public domain. Senator
Chamberlain called for the establishment of a military appellate
tribunal to address “unjust sentences” streaming out of the
thousands of wartime courts-martial, both home and abroad. In
January 1919, the executive committee of the American Bar
Association commented on the need for reforming military law’s
administration (though its committee report later was “generally
favorable to the military justice system”268).
Later that month, Chamberlain introduced a new bill – mostly
drafted by Ansell himself – that would have reimagined the Articles
of War along the lines Ansell had proposed. It would have required
that a judge advocate be appointed for each general and special
court-martial; it would have required the immediate announcement
of acquittals; it would have given the Judge Advocate General power
to modify or revise findings and sentences and even to order new
trials if necessary.269 Hearings were held, but his own committee
did not advance the bill to the full Senate for debate.270 At the end
of the month, another front opened when Ansell “launched his
public campaign for revision” of the Articles of War and “established
himself as the standard bearer for the reformation of military

264. Id. at 40.
265. Id. at 22-23.
266. Borch, supra note 195, at 43; Brown, supra note 224, at 30. For a
discussion of Ansell’s proposed Articles of War, based on these objections, see
generally Morgan, supra note 152.
267. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (1917), supra note 261, at 151.
268. Brown, supra note 224, at 9, n. 47.
269. Id. at 38-42.
270. Id. at 9.
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justice.”271
In March, Secretary Baker took a step toward shielding his
Department from further public criticism. He wrote to Crowder:
My Dear General Crowder: I have been deeply concerned, as you
know, over the harsh criticisms recently uttered upon our system of
military justice. During the times of peace, prior to the war, I do not
recall that our system of military law ever became the subject of
public attack on the ground of its structural defects. Nor during the
entire war period of 1917 and 1918, while the camps and cantonments
were full of men and the strain of preparation was at its highest
tension, do I remember noticing any complaints either in the public
press or in Congress or in the general mail arriving at this office. The
recent outburst of criticism and complaint, voiced in public by a few
individuals whose position entitled them to credit, and carried
throughout the country by the press, has been to me a matter of
surprise and sorrow. I have had most deeply at heart the interests of
the Army and the welfare of the individual soldier, and I have the
firmest determination that justice shall be done under military
law.272

After assuring Crowder that his faith in the system and his
confidence in the Judge Advocate General was strong, Baker
confessed
“[b]ut it is not enough for me to possess this faith and this conviction.
It is highly important that the public mind should receive ample
reassurance on the subject . . . you are in a position to make a concise
survey of the entire field and to furnish the main facts in a form which
will permit ready perusal by the intelligent men and women who are
so deeply interested in this subject.”273

At Baker’s request, Crowder delivered a seventy-page
memorandum entitled “Military Justice During the War.”274 The
report was defensive in tone. Crowder took several pages to detail
his long-articulated desire to revise and modernize the Articles of
War, dating back to a letter he wrote to the Acting Judge Advocate
General of the Army (G. Norman Lieber) in 1888 when still a
Cavalry lieutenant, suggesting that no one in the Army had a firmer
resolve to identify that which ought to be fixed and then working
assiduously to fix it over the length of his career. He expressed his
“firm belief in the merits and high standards of our system of
military law” and that a proper review the facts would “vindicate it
from the recently published reproaches.”275
271. Id. at 10.
272. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, to General Crowder (Mar. 1, 1919),
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/letter.pdf [perma.cc/86KW-J28B].
273. Id.
274. Brown, supra note 224, at 10.
275. U.S. Dep’t of War, Military Justice During the War: A Letter from the
Judge Advocate General of the Army to the Secretary of War in Reply to a
Request
for
Information
(Mar.
10,
1919),
at
4-8,
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/letter.pdf [perma.cc/XKE4-TG7C].
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Agreeing with General Sherman’s comment from nearly forty
years earlier, that military law is meant to govern armies of “strong
men” not protect the rights and safety of the general public as
civilian criminal law intends.276 Crowder wrote: “military justice
aims to make the man a better soldier or to eliminate him from the
military organization if he cannot be improved, while civilian justice
looks to the ultimate protection of the community at large.”277 Yet
he also believed strongly that the systems and procedures of
military justice were virtually the same as in most civilian
jurisdictions: “The proceedings follow the fundamentals of our
criminal common law,” he concluded.278 For example, it gave
sufficient notice and opportunity to defend oneself; created a fair
and open inquiry into the facts; ensured the witnesses, members,
and counsel were sworn under oath; provided access to witnesses
and to legal representation; including a proper arraignment and
right to challenge the court members; did not breach a statute of
limitation; refrained from violating a soldier’s privilege against selfincrimination; demanded that evidence sustain the findings;
reviewed for legal sufficiency by a two-step appellate process
unheard of in civilian law – first, by the accused’s commanding
general acting as reviewing authority, advised by his senior judge
advocate who provides that officer with a “quasi-judicial opinion,”
followed by rigorous scouring of the record by judge advocates in his
office and subsequently by a three-officer board of review (“acting
as an appellate court”), then the Chief of the Military Justice
Division, then the Judge Advocate General.279
All of this, in his view, ultimately protected soldiers from
“arbitrary” decisions by commanding officers. Recounting that the
six national guard judge advocates assigned duty on the review
boards in Washington, D.C., included one former state supreme
court chief justice, a former justice on the Philippine Island
Supreme Court, and two criminal law professors, Crowder opined
that “it may be safely asserted that in no State of the Union is any
more thorough scrutiny given to the record of a criminal case than
is given in my office, and that in most State supreme courts the
scrutiny does not approach in thoroughness the methods here
employed.”280
He further described the novel system of “indeterminate
sentencing with no minimum” as a virtual guarantee that a large
number of incarcerated soldiers were serving what amounted to a
“probationary” term of confinement, especially for “purely military
276. Id. at 14.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 15.
279. Id. at 14-18.
280. Id. at 14-16. In the seventy-page Report, Crowder employs the word
“scrutiny” thirty-four times, often preceded by “experienced,” “skilled,” and
“thorough.”
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offenses” like desertion, disobedience, and absence without leave.281
Such sentencing meant that these convicted felons – regardless of
how superficially severe their confinement term might seem to
civilians – could be, and regularly were, commuted by the prison
commandant at any earlier time, releasing the soldier back into
service.282 And even those remaining behind bars, Crowder claimed,
were the beneficiaries of an “enlightened” system of vocational,
rehabilitative, and psychiatric services without parallel in civilian
penitentiaries.283
Crowder suggested that any defects were the result – a
foreseeable and not unreasonable result – of the high volume of
cases coming out of an unprecedented war involving millions of
American troops.284 But, he cautioned, even the argument that
commanders were sending too many “trivial” offenses to courtmartial was undercut by the data: Crowder took pains to detail the
raw numbers and ratios of courts-martial to Army personnel
occurring before the War and those by the Wars end.285 According
to his records, the ratio of all types of courts-martial (summary,
special, and general) to personnel strength went down,
dramatically, once the War began and progressed despite armed
conflict naturally giving rise to situations that would make new
draftees – unfamiliar with the rigid disciplinary requirements of
Army work – more likely to demonstrate insubordination and
disorderliness and give commanders more reason to prosecute.286
“There could be no more conclusive demonstration that
commanding officers, though faced with a situation full of
inducement to rigor in enforcing discipline among raw and
untrained men, did in fact use remarkable consideration and selfrestraint in not resorting to the instrumentalities of courtsmartial.”287
In some respects, Crowder’s letter assumed too much or was
outright misleading. Though he conceded that the role of the judge
advocate at trial had no civilian analogue (because the officer
advised both the court and the defendant, and presented evidence
against that defendant, and was almost never a lawyer himself), he
mistakenly analogized the role of the general’s legal advisor – the
staff judge advocate (usually a major or lieutenant colonel at the
time) to that of a civilian appellate court: “The judge advocate’s
main function in military justice” is to review the record of trial and
he
advises the commanding general whether the trial has been
281. Id. at 18.
282. Id. at 18-19.
283. Id. at 19-20.
284. Id. at 21.
285. Id. at 23-24.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 24.
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conducted according to law in every respect; this includes the duty to
advise whether the weight of evidence sustains the conviction,
regardless of legal error. In this aspect he is essentially an appellate
judge, and it is his duty to enforce the law as fully on behalf of the
accused as on the behalf of the Government . . . [while] the judge
advocate thus attached to the division commander’s staff has other
duties of legal advice, corresponding to those of the Attorney General
of the United States as legal adviser of the Government in all civil
matters . . . in military criminal justice his function is essentially
judicial.288

Crowder’s understanding of “judicial” was overbroad and
disingenuous. He likened both the division’s judge advocate and the
“review boards” in Washington to appellate courts because they
both enjoy and employ the technical expertise of neutral lawyers to
parse the record for legal error and conformance with legal
standards. But appellate courts are not advisory bodies that offer
their opinions to the discretionary and conclusive judgment of
another non-legal government official like the Secretary of War or
Division Commander. Appellate courts’ judgments are final, unless
reversed or modified by a superior appellate court, and are binding
and directive on the parties below. In the military justice system of
the World War I era, and as both Crowder and Baker well knew, the
only parties with such plenary authority were in the chain-ofcommand;
the
legal
advisor
to
the
court-martial
appointing/reviewing authority, no matter his legal acumen or
persuasive confidence, was nothing more than a staff officer
assigned to that very commander who could and did reject the
advice. The review boards, too, were advisory only.
Crowder acknowledged that the system did have flaws that
could and should be corrected, and gave Secretary Baker a brief list
of seven, but none of which would have triggered a wholesale project
of reform and “civilianization” envisioned by Ansell.289 Crowder
recommended that the War Department issue a new General Order
that would amend the Manual for Courts-Martial to require every
summary court-martial convening authority (typically, a battalion
commander) to personally investigate, or delegate the duty to a
qualified subordinate officer, the accusation.290 He also
recommended a rule prohibiting commanders from ordering cases
to general courts-martial without first receiving a written opinion
from his staff judge advocate to avoid the appearance or actuality of
bias and the prosecution of “trivial” matters;291 of course, nothing
required the convening authority to follow that opinion. Third,
Crowder wished to increase the punitive authority of the special
court-martial. He wanted to raise the maximum punishment to two
288. Id. at 26-27.
289. Id. at 62-64.
290. Id. at 63.
291. Id.

2021]

Martial Misconduct and Weak Defenses

915

years of confinement and a dishonorable discharge, under a theory
that this would reduce the commands’ reliance on general courtsmartial and reduce the number of allegedly unfairly severe
sentences.292 He further wanted to caution generals that they
should reserve general courts-martial for only the kinds of offenses
that could not be meaningfully addressed (re: punished) under the
limits of a special or summary court-martial, or with the more
restricted disciplinary tools of non-judicial punishment.293 Crowder
moved closer to Ansell’s position in at least one respect: he thought
it prudent and realistic to assign a judge advocate officer as a court
member to all “serious, difficult, and complicated cases” if
reasonably available.294 Of course, this movement would have been
measured in inches, for it was far from the kind of learned counsel
and learned judging that Ansell wished for.295
After reading the Crowder memo, Senator Chamberlain
asked Baker to print a reply that had been drafted by Ansell. Baker
refused but instead invited Ansell to submit his views (he did the
same day) and draft a bill to revise the Articles of War, probably in
an effort to render him “harmless”296 by giving him an official
conduit for his argument that could be processed, considered, and
ignored – which it was. In lieu of success with either his superiors
at the War Department or in Congress, Ansell returned to making
speeches and writing articles.297 Cornell Law Professor George
Bogert, echoing Crowder’s memo, criticized Ansell’s call for reform,
saying it was based on “gross exaggerations, argument from isolated
single instances to broad general considerations, statements of halftruths, misrepresentations and suppression of facts. There are
defects, but they are minor and easily curable.”298

D. The Kernan Board
Meanwhile, Senator Chamberlain introduced a bill intended to
revise the Articles of War and held extensive subcommittee
hearings. At the same time, the War Department established a
board to study and report its views on whether – and how – to
improve the court-martial system; in substance, though, it was
directly responding to the proposed Chamberlain bill and Ansell’s

292. Id. at 64.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Statement of Samuel T. Ansell, supra note 225, at 135-36, 42.
296. Morgan, supra note 10, at 172 (note that Morgan was one of the
professors-turned-judge-advocate working for Ansell during that period, and
one of Ansell’s most preeminent supporters).
297. See, e.g., Ansell, supra note 150.
298. George Gleason Bogert, Courts-Martial: Criticisms and Proposed
Reforms, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 18, 47 (1919).
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convictions.299 The Kernan Board, chaired by Major General Francis
J. Kernan, consisted of one other general officer (a National
Guardsman from New York), one judge advocate (a lieutenant
colonel), and a field artillery lieutenant colonel serving as the
Board’s recorder. Over a two-month period, the group invited
comments from all officers who were then, or who had, exercised
general court-martial authority and from all judge advocates – in
total, 225 active duty, national guard, and retired or discharged
officers responded. According to the Board, it characterized the
responses in one of three ways: general support for the current
system, intermediate, and “severely condemn.” More than half of
the total respondents (115) were classified in the “general support”
column, and only 43 were characterized as strongly critical.300
In summarizing its findings, the Board reported that “the
opinions of officers of longest and most intimate experience with
courts-martial are generally strongly in favor of the existent [sic]
system, and, while conceding some defects and offering some
criticism, they in a general way defend the system and attribute
imperfect results achieved under it not to the system itself but to
the inexperience of those called upon to administer it as members,
judge advocates, or counsel in court-martial trials.”301 Seemingly
ignoring that courts-martial were also conducted outside of active
combat, and ignoring the fact that the responsibility for the
“inexperience” of members and counsel lies with the chain-ofcommand who assigned them to those trials, the Board was
persuaded by these senior commanders because they understood
better than anybody the “overwhelming importance of discipline in
a command when it was subjected to the supreme test of battle[.]”302
Those officers who had no direct combat exposure during the War,
or whose experience was remote from the fighting, and those with
little time in the service, compared military justice unfavorably
with civilian criminal procedure. Their criticisms were similar to
Ansell’s: members of the court were “ignorant of the law” and lacked
sound discretion; officers assigned as prosecutors (trial judge
advocates) were “often incompetent;” worthless cases proceeded to
trial because there was no effective pre-trial investigation of the
facts; and too much discretion to punish was left in the hands of the
court members, leading to “unduly severe sentences.”303
The main gist of the critics’ arguments, according to the
Board, was the “radical” need to transfer authority from soldiers
(commanders) to lawyers (who are “soldiers by title and courtesy
299. Proceedings and Report of Special War Department Board on CourtsMartial and Their Procedure (July 17, 1919), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/proceedings.pdf [perma.cc/CSY4-3U56] [Kernan Proceedings and Report].
300. Id. at 14.
301. Id. at 4.
302. Id. at 5.
303. Id.
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only, if at all”).304 This preference for adding forms of legalism into
the court-martial was wrong-headed, they wrote because the “real
purpose of the court-martial is to enable commanders to insure [sic]
discipline in their forces.” The president’s authority as commander
in chief, they said, cannot be “abridged” by Congress exercising its
Article I power to make rules for the government and regulation of
the armed forces. They suggested – by asking somewhat rhetorically
– that the nature of command, derived from the Commander-inChief, “embrace[s]” and “impl[ies] . . . not merely the right to direct
the use of the force, but the duty and authority to make and
maintain the force fit and suitable to its purpose by instruction, by
training, and by discipline.”305
The Kernan Board did comment, reasonably, on the apparent
inconsistency in punishments – “cases absolutely alike and hence
called for absolutely identical punishments, are rare.”306 Sentences,
they correctly noted, are functions of unique case facts and offender
characteristics, and the effect of the crime on fellow soldiers or on
the mission.307 However, the Board viewed the “radical” changes
proposed in the Chamberlain bill in “either-or” terms: either
commanders have all power and responsibility, or the lawyers do.
This was a remarkably narrow way to think about the possibilities,
for it ignored the opportunity to vary and caveat the commander’s
ability to orchestrate the military justice system without diluting
the commander’s ability to command and control forces; nor did it
consider its fundamental characterization of military law as being
open to debate. Instead, the Board called the bill an “attempt by law
to emasculate the legitimate and heretofore undisputed authority
of the president as commander-in-chief.”308
To achieve the purpose of their existence armies must be clothed and
fed and instructed and disciplined in preparation for the test of
combat . . . [therefore] [t]he highest qualification for making a courtmartial achieve the object of its existence [discipline] is a thorough
knowledge of men and discipline in the profession of arms, not mere
expertness in law.309

Because the English kings could unilaterally administer their
304. Id. at 5-6.
305. Id. at 6-7. Similar arguments continue to be made. Compare
GENEROUS, supra note 10, at 4 (“An attempt to graft onto courts-martial certain
concepts borrowed directly from civilian law might raise its own set of problems.
There are limits on the extent to which the essentially autocratic armed forces
are able to adopt notions regarded as precious by a democratic society.”) with
Charles Dunlap, Civilianizing Military Justice? Sorry, it Can’t – and Shouldn’t
–
Work,
WAR
ON
THE
ROCKS
(Oct.
8,
2015),
www.warontherocks.com/2015/10/civilianizing-military-justice-sorry-it-cantand-shouldnt-work/ [perma.cc/X5HM-PJ9Q].
306. Kernan Proceedings and Report, supra note 299, at 12.
307. Id. at 11-12.
308. Id. at 7.
309. Id. at 9 (italics in original).
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military justice system, and because George Washington did, the
Board concluded that modern day presidents and commanders
should also be able to create, manage, administer, direct, and
regulate courts-martial “without express authority of law.”310 Of
course, the Board seemed to ignore British parliamentary
involvement since the late seventeenth century, forgot that
Congress had been promulgating the Articles of War (a law) since
the Revolution, and made no distinction between a commander’s
interest in martial offenses (that disrupt or endanger the mission or
his soldiers) and the kind of misconduct that was nothing more than
civilian common law crimes.311
The Board’s report is an unusual product. At points, it
appears clearly written by a lawyer familiar enough with terms like
“ab initio” to use them without pause.312 It made a lawyerly
textualist or originalist argument about the meaning of certain
words:
not only did our military system come essentially from England but
the language in which that system is expressed is our own, so that
words or phrases imbedded in our organic law may be taken to
connote the same thing and to carry the same implications as in the
mother tongue.313

As if in a defense attorney’s closing argument, it employed
eighteen rhetorical questions (e.g., “Is it not . . . ?” and “Will not its .
. . ?”) in just over eleven pages of the Report.314 Nevertheless, the
Report lacked indica of having pretentions of a persuasive legal
brief. The document contained no citations to legal treatises, no
direct references to statutes or regulations to compare and contrast
military law against civilian law, and no allusions or citations to the
Supreme Court, or any court’s, case law. It contained a plethora of
arguments that were – putting it generously – spurious.
Strikingly, the Board made a number of these absurd or
reality-stretching claims. For instance, it argued that military
justice should not be taken from the chain-of-command because
there might be an occasion to, not only relieve an ineffective officer
310. Id. at 7.
311. See supra, Part I.
312. Kernan Proceedings and Report, supra note 299, at 13.
313. Id. at 7. Ansell attacked this line of argument much later, writing that
the British Articles of War were simply not meant for a constitutional scheme
in which command and control of the military rests with a chief executive but
the making of rules “for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces” rests with a legislature. Britain’s Articles were promulgated by and in
the name of the king to govern and regulate members of the army; these soldiers
and officers swore fealty to the monarch – the “army was his army” – and
officers, drawing their “authority from the crown,” represented the king,
“applying his law, meting out his penalties, following his procedure and obeying
his commands.” Ansell, supra note 169, at 148-49.
314. Kernan Proceedings and Report, supra note 229, passim (four on page
6; seven on pages 7-8; just one on page 9; four on page 10; and two on page 12).
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of command, but to court-martial the commander for “misconduct”
if a military campaign or offensive turned into a tactical or strategic
disaster.315 If such a proceeding were to be reviewed for legal error
by lawyers in Washington, the Board warned, the swift
condemnation made by the court in the field (made up of the
general’s peers) could be set aside upon a legal technicality.316 Most
modern officers would know this is bunk: not only would the defeat
be more about the commander’s competence as a planner, leader,
tactician, and strategist (and factors unforeseeable and beyond the
reach of any commander’s control) than about “misconduct,” but the
idea of subjecting a senior commander to anything like a federal
conviction, dismissal, and possible incarceration for his military
defeat stinks of aggressive, militant totalitarianism akin to the
violent Nazi and Soviet purges of generals who were thought to be
disloyal or incompetent.
In another example of questionable reasoning, the Board felt
that the Articles of War should not require the appointing authority
to assign to courts-martial only those officers he deemed “fair and
impartial and competent” because – when if commander did make
those assignments – it would signal that those not selected for courtmartial duty lack those qualities. Moreover, how could the
appointing authority know whether or not subordinate officers held
such qualities? The first objection is laughable. The latter objection
is curious. The Board either forgot or conveniently ignored, the
realistic possibility (if not probability) that senior commanders
lower in the chain-of-command could and would make
recommendations for court membership based on their closer
observations of the officer in question. Because we know the Board
felt so warmly about the inherent justness and maturity of all
commanders, this objection – discounting the role and input of the
subordinate commanders – is not even consistent let alone
persuasive.317
The Board also inverted the paradigmatic agency relationship
between a commander and a lawyer, saying that the commander
(like a surgeon who can distinguish between mere discoloration on
a foot from gangrene) is the true expert while the lawyer, like a
layman or patient, is largely ignorant of the subtle clues and
incapable of judging what the proper remedy should be, except as
the thoughtless mechanics of a procedure that they must
administer.318
Finally, the Board recommended against permitting enlisted
soldiers to serve as fact-finding and sentencing members of the
court because doing so would be (somehow) antidemocratic.319
315. Id. at 8.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 19.
318. Id. at 10.
319. Id. at 18.
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Strangely, the Board wrote that including such citizens – those
without the “prestige” of rank – would be “out of harmony with the
American conception of democracy and of our confidence in our
institutions.” They unsubtly suggested that only officers have the
“capacity to discern the truth, the ability to weigh evidence, and the
experience to fix punishments commensurate with the offense and
with the need to deter others. These qualities usually imply
education and experience.”320 If enlisted soldiers possessed such
qualities, the Board said, they would be officers already. Because
the Report contained no empirical or statistical reporting of data
about the Army and its soldiers (other than surveying officers for
their opinion), the Board provided no sound reason for believing in
this type of professional caste prejudice. It did not much matter
anyway, the Board said for it claimed – without any evidence – that
“the enlisted men of our armies have full confidence in the fairness
and ability of officers to do justice as members of courts.”321
Ultimately, the Kernan Board – like institutional supporters of
the status quo in this century – found little to divert It from Its
conclusion that major reform was uncalled for: “military justice is
carried out at times under great urgency and stress, where the nice
deliberation and finish of the civil procedure is utterly impossible .
. . [so] this board feels justified in averring that our system stands
vindicated.”322 Nevertheless, it recognized or sensed an obligation to
assuage the concerns of at least some of the court-martial critics. It
recommended that the Articles require that the (single) officer
selected to serve as judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel at
a summary court-martial should be “best qualified . . . by reason of
rank, experience, and judicial temperament.”323 And, nudging closer
toward Ansell’s view, the Board recommended that the appointing
authority appoint defense counsel for the accused in all general and
special courts-martial, and that the Army should actively encourage
young line officers to study law and then use them to as judge
advocates for a period of years. “The most serious defect in our
court-martial system arise from the lack of competent trial judge
advocates and counsel.”324
But the Board did not actually put that much faith in counsel
– even if educated and experienced – for it stopped short of
recommending that the military rules of evidence have as their
model the federal rules for civilian courts. The reason: it would
demand too much new learning and studying of the lawyers – they
would need “permanent offices elaborately equipped with libraries
and with abundant leisure to pursue the niceties of legal subtleties”

320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 13-14.
323. Id. at 19.
324. Id. at 22-23.
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and real-world conditions were not amenable to such luxuries.325 It
also recommended against a civilian court of military appeals, for
“those best informed through long experience in court-martial trials
believe almost universally that very few innocent men are found
guilty by military courts and sentenced to punishment.”326 We can
wonder in astonishment, now, how the Board could know this
without having an appellate court to make those determinations,
and at why – if this were true – there would be any need at all for
defense counsel or trained judge advocates.

E. Ansell’s Criticisms of the Kernan Board
Ansell testified again before the Senate Subcommittee on
Military Affairs in August 1919, after he had resigned at his
Regular Army rank of Lieutenant Colonel.327 Feeling uninhibited,
he strongly criticized the “common sense” of the Kernan Board,328
and accused Crowder and the War Department of not acting in good
faith regarding General Order no. 7, saying that while it was a “step
in the right direction,” it was really nothing more than an attempt
to “head off a more thorough and drastic reform.” 329 He wanted to
“subject courts-martial to legal restraint through the establishment
of a revisory power in the office of the Judge Advocate General”
because commanders – and the War Department – seemed to
believe the granting of “mercy or clemency” was a “convenient mode
of doing justice.”330 Simply having a board to review these records
after the fact, with only an ability to recommend changes, was
insufficient.
Do not think that you can take a human being labelled a lawyer and
put him in the war department and subject him to the power of
military command and expect him to be judicially independent. He
will not be.331

For Ansell, no post-conviction amelioration of punishment, like
permitting the soldier to return to duty, excused the original unjust
and “illegal” conviction and punishment.332 One case he pointed to
involved a young private, assigned to kitchen duty at a camp in New
Jersey. He was caught smoking outside by a lieutenant; the officer
ordered him to put the cigarette out and hand over the pack, but the
325. Id. at 27.
326. Id. at 29-31.
327. Statement of Samuel T. Ansell—Resumed, Before the United States
Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, “Establishment of Military Justice—
Proposed Amendment of the Articles of War (Aug. 26, 1919), at 115-69,
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/08_26.pdf [perma.cc/WTC2-N68P].
328. Id. at 120.
329. Id. at 134.
330. Id. at 115-17.
331. Id. at 134.
332. Id. at 118.
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private refused. The soldier was charged, prosecuted, convicted, and
sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and twenty-five years in
prison.333 Ansell took particular personal insult to the defenders of
the status quo (like the Kernan Board) criticizing him for apparent
lack of sufficient time or experience in the military – that more time
and experience somehow would lead an informed person to both
understand the need for this sort of rigid discipline and appreciate
the system’s inherent reasonableness. This was a system whose
“reasonableness” accepted twenty-five years for disobeying this
kind of order, as if all orders carried the same import and all
disobedience carried the same costs. He reminded the committee
that he has as much or more command time then many of the
general officers testifying in support of the Articles of War: “they
come here and would have you simply be impressed by their
expertness.”
The mere fact that a man is a major general, or certainly the mere
fact that he was a major general up to the beginning of the war, when
some of them did see some service, was indicative of little more than
a long time conformance to a system which in itself tended to arrest
mental and professional development . . . with entire accuracy it can
be said that many of our generals are jokes to everybody else in the
world except ourselves and themselves.334

Ansell acknowledged that these officers did have some
command experience, but not experience leading larger-thancompany-sized units before taking on command of divisions or
larger organizations. Rather than inspiring their soldiers and
managing with sensibility and sound judgment and temperament,
such an officer – in Ansell’s jaundiced view – was nothing better
than a “chief administrator . . . a red-tape artist” sitting behind a
desk “busying himself with the thousand and one administrative
requirements that simply clog our peacetime administration of the
Army.”335
Ansell then engaged in the equivalent of military legal
apostasy by criticizing the “Blackstone of the Army,” Colonel
William Winthrop, whose tome formed the analytical justification
for much of the modern Army’s “reactionary” desire to uphold this
“anachronistic” system of deference to the commander’s
presumptively judicial qualities. While a “man of great capacity to
express himself, and who was also a keen legal reasoner,” he was
first and foremost “a military man.” His strongest argument was
that the nature of military law fulfilled only an executive branch
function – it was an instrumentality of command. This was, to
Ansell, a non sequitur. Because military justice and courts-martial
were not expressly made part of the federal judiciary in the
333. Id. at 120.
334. Id. at 121.
335. Id. at 122.
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Constitution, Winthrop made an unjustified leap of logic to conclude
“therefore they [courts-martial] belong to the power of the military
command, an executive agency,” foreclosing direct involvement by
Congress or standards imposed by civilian courts.336
Writing in 1920, after he had testified before Congress, Ansell
wrote in a law review article this very public and unequivocally
severe denunciation of the system:
[T]he existing system of Military Justice is un-American, having come
to us by inheritance and rather witless adoption out of a system of
government which we regard as fundamentally intolerable; that it is
archaic, belonging as it does to an age when armies were but bodies
of armed retainers and bands of mercenaries; that it is a system
arising out of and regulated by the mere power of Military Command
rather than Law; and that it has ever resulted, as it must ever result,
in such injustice as to crush the spirit of the individual subjected to
it, shock the public conscience and alienate public esteem and
affection from the Army that insists upon maintaining it.
Intemperate criticism of those who have pointed out these defects will
not serve to conceal them.337

He further described the military’s criminal justice system –
“the right hand of the commanding officer to aid him in the
maintenance of discipline” – as a “vicious anachronism,”
“monarchical,” “reactionary,” “archaic,” “mediaeval,” where the
members (the fact-finders) “need know no law, are presumed to
know no law, and, as a rule, do know no law,” a “do-as-you-pleasecode” illustrated by regularly recurring “ridiculous blunders with
tragic consequences,” and (more revolting than anything else)
allowed to be such by the commanders who manage it with the
“witless” acquiescence of Congress who refused to do anything but
senselessly copy a penal system from a country whose political
system was loathed.338
Summarizing the numerous defects of military justice up
through the World War, and which resisted any substantive
changes when Congress “revised” the Articles of War in 1916, Ansell
pulled no punches. This accusation is, again, worth quoting in full:
Proceedings of courts-martial, consisting of unlettered men and
having with them no judge of the law, and applying a code that,
though penal, is not specific either in defining the offenses, penalty or
procedure, must be expected to be and frequently they are wrong from
beginning to end; wrong in fact; wrong in law; wrong in the conduct
of the inquiry; wrong in the findings; wrong in the “advice” given by
compliant and impotent law officers, who recommend the approval of
such proceedings; wrong in the ignorant confirmation of such
proceedings; wrong in everything. And yet, of such errors there can

336. Id. at 123.
337. Ansell, supra note 169, at 53.
338. Id. passim.
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be no review.339

A version of the Chamberlain bill, toned down from the
“radical” restructuring advocated by Ansell and clearly influenced
by the testimony of Crowder and the Kernan Report, was eventually
passed with the support of the War Department, now known as the
1920 Articles of War.340 It did not include a provision for a new
civilian court of military appeals, and it did not permit enlisted
soldiers the opportunity to serve as court-martial members to try
the facts and render judgments on their fellow soldiers or officers.
While not what Ansell had hoped for, the 1920 revision to the
Articles was a significant departure from the previous versions and
from what had become custom and conventional through the first
World War. Among other reforms, it required a preliminary
investigation (codifying what had only been permitted in the nonstatutory Manual for Courts-Martial) with an opportunity for the
accused to call witnesses and to cross-examine the prosecution’s
witnesses. It required that minor infractions and offenses be
disposed of with a procedure that has since become known as “nonjudicial punishment,” wherein the limited range of punishments
(which could not include a discharge or imprisonment) is a function
of the rank of the accused and rank of the commander imposing it.341
As an important constraint on the commanding officer, it required
that the commanding general receive, in writing, a legal opinion
from his staff judge advocate (though it was, and still is, not binding
on the convening authority). It required that the members (the
panel) consist only of officers “best qualified by reason of age,
training, experience, and judicial temperament” but still left it to
the discretion of the convening authority to select those members.342
In a novel addition, it provided for the punishment for noncompliance with the code’s procedure and abuse of power by those
in military authority.343 It provided for a new “law member” for
every general court-martial to rule on interlocutory questions,
including the admissibility of evidence.344 It required defense
counsel to be appointed for the accused, and either military or
civilian attorneys were authorized.345 It increased the minimum
number of members for a guilty verdict from a simple majority to
two-thirds, required three-fourths of the members to agree on a
sentence of more than ten years in prison; and required unanimity
for a death sentence. The 1920 revisions also created the first
statutorily required appellate review process consisting of judge

339. Id. at 65.
340. Act of 4 June 1920, ch. 2, 41 Stat. 759, 787 (1920) [1920 Articles of War].
341. Id. at Article 104.
342. Id. at Article 4.
343. Ansell, supra note 169, at 155.
344. 1920 Articles of War, supra note 240, at Articles 8 & 31.
345. Id. at Articles 11 & 17.
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advocates, enacting Ansell’s Boards of Review.346 It prohibited the
commander from ordering the court to reconsider acquittals, and –
if sentences were reviewed – they could not be increased.347 It would
be these revised Articles of War that governed and regulated the
U.S. Army up to, and through, World War II.348
346. Id. at Article 50½. The Board’s opinion on legal sufficiency, however,
was advisory only. Nevertheless, it was a progressive step. In cases where the
accused was sentenced to a period of incarceration, or a discharge or dismissal,
or death sentence, the new rule required the Board to review the record of trial
and opine on its legal sufficiency (and then forward that opinion to Judge
Advocate General) before it could be transmitted to the Secretary of War and
President for action. If both the Board and the Judge Advocate General
concurred that legal errors below prejudiced the accused (“injuriously affecting
the substantial rights of the accused”), the findings and sentence were to be
vacated in whole or in part and returned to the convening authority for
rehearing or some other action deemed appropriate. Every other general courtmartial record, regardless of the severity of the sentence, would be reviewed by
the office of the Judge Advocate General. If that initial screening believed it to
be insufficient to support the findings or sentence, it would be directed to one of
the standing Boards of Review; if the Board concurred, it was sent to the Judge
Advocate General; if the Judge Advocate General concurred, it was forwarded
to the Secretary of War and President for action. The President could then
“approve, disapprove, or vacate, in whole or in part, any findings of guilty, or
confirm, mitigate, commute, remit, or vacate any sentence as confirmed or
modified, and he may restore the accused to all rights affected by the findings
and sentence, or part thereof, held to be invalid.”
347. Ansell, supra note 169, at 155.
348. It was not until the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
in 1950 that the Navy’s system of judicial and non-judicial punishment would
mirror that of the Army’s, when the Code merged the previously distinct laws.
For the previous ninety years (since 1862), the Navy had its own criminal code.
Articles for the Government of the Navy of the United States, Act of July 17,
1862,
www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/37th-congress/session2/c37s2ch204.pdf [perma.cc/NPX6-L9GN]. This Act was only a modification of
the Rules and Regulations of 1799. The Navy had no Ansell-type reformer, nor
a sense of urgency to debate, update, and refine its rules, or – possibly – sailors
just complained about their treatment less than soldiers did. See Generous,
supra note 10, at 11-13 (“The basic understanding was that the sailor
surrendered his claim to constitutional rights upon enlistment”). As a result,
the Navy’s system of justice looked very much like the Army’s code (at least
until Crowder’s reorganization of the Articles in 1916) – commanding officers
had essentially the same degree of discretion, the same kinds of martial
misconduct were criminalized, and the court-martial system was tiered. On
paper, though, the Navy actually had a more robust and organized appellate
system than the pre-1920 Articles of War, for every conviction at a General
Court-Martial was reviewed for legal error by the office of the Navy’s Judge
Advocate General and the Bureau of Naval Personnel could provide advice on
discipline imposed below. In reality, the legal review was often conducted by
non-lawyers. Id. at 12. Substantively, the 1862 Navy Articles, however, did
deviate from the tenor of the Articles of War. Most noticeably, it contained an
interesting imposition of a duty on commanding officers that the Articles of War
did not. In its very first Article, Congress told “all commanders of all fleets,
squadrons, naval stations, and vessels belonging to the Navy” that they are:
strictly enjoined and required to show themselves a good example of
virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination, to be vigilant in inspecting
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To Ansell’s credit, the bill’s title included the phrase: “establish
military justice” suggesting it did not exist prior to the new Articles,
as if it were a revolution in the exercise and structure of military
law. He believed that the bill was based on the “fundamental
theory” that courts-martial are “inherently courts, their functions
inherently judicial, and that their powers must be judicially
exercised.”349 It would be another ninety-eight years before the
Supreme Court described the military justice system in similar
terms in Ortiz.350

V.

(UNSUCCESSFUL) ARGUMENTS

A. Past Claims in Defense of Convention – a Scared
Theology
This abbreviated history of the contentious period of reform
before and after World War I reveals that arguments (really, just
claims) of military justice’s status quo struck several chords. First,
there is the claim that taking away authority from senior military
leaders would be a “radical” disaster with inevitably dire
consequences.351 Relatedly, the second claim was that the system as
is worked well enough, but for the need for the minor adjustment to
remedy an outlier travesty of justice, according to experienced
officers – especially those with direct experience in combat
leadership positions.352 The third line of argument held that
military justice was a more efficient set of processes, and that this
efficiency – even if it is the result of fewer due process protections –
is a good in itself that justifies the system.353 Fourth, advocates for
the conduct of all who may be placed under their command; to guard
against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct
all who may be guilty of them. (cite).
Since 1956, the U.S. Code – beyond the Uniform Code of Military Justice
itself – has included strikingly similar language in its “Requirement of
Exemplary Conduct.” 10 U.S.C. § 5947, 64 Stat. 146 (1956). Nearly identical
language is found in another part of the Code that imposes the same sort of duty
on Army commanding officers and “others in authority.” 10 U.S.C. § 3583, Pub.
L. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1726 (1997). It is, perhaps, because naval commanding
officers often operated well beyond the line-of-sight of their superiors, and
because the temptation to impose strict, swift, and uncompromising
punishment was present in maritime conditions where even minor misconduct
by a sailor could endanger the lives of an entire vessel, that Congress believed
imposition of this control measure on Naval commanders – and its reminder to
diligently “inspect the conduct” of their subordinates – was thought to be worth
explicitly stating.
349. Ansell, supra note 169, at 152.
350. Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018).
351. E.g., Kernan Proceedings and Report, supra note 229.
352. Id.
353. E.g., Wigmore, supra note 155.
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the status quo argued that military justice is necessarily different
from civilian criminal law because the communities they regulate
are inherently different; the military community exists to fulfill a
specified purpose (“exercising the largest measure of force at the
will of the nation”).354 Fifth, proponents claimed that constitutional
norms, prohibitions, liberties, and protections were unsuitable for
the kinds of circumstances in which military commanders must
make disciplinary decisions.355 Sixth, notwithstanding the absence
of certain constitutional considerations, military justice is still a
system involving “judicial” functions, even if its judicial forms are
significantly dissimilar.356 Seventh, nevertheless, these distinct
judicial forms are merely the means and methods to achieve the
ultimate “purpose” of discipline; the aim was to make the individual
soldier better, or at least make the army better by removing those
soldiers who could not be rehabilitated.357 Eighth, commanders
simply know better – they, not lawyers, were the experts in how,
when, and why to discipline and punish the unique community
under their charge.358 Finally, the ninth type of claim made in
defense of the status quo was that swift imposition of punishment
at the direction of the commander (including death sentences),
absent time-consuming appellate review by neutral lawyers and
judges, was a (military) necessity – one of general deterrence,
especially in combat conditions.
These nine arguments evoke a sense of a theological belief
system, one that demanded credence in the distinct separateness of
the military culture and its members, and one that demanded a
trust that civilians (or military lawyers adopting civilian due
process norms) were not as qualified as the “clergy” of military
leadership to determine what ought to be within their disciplinary
and punitive jurisdiction. As will be discussed below, these claims
are not as axiomatic as their advocates promised and are related in
form, tone, and gist to those made a century later.

B. Present Claims in Defense of Convention – a
Privileged Position
The contemporary controversy that Congress faces over
reforming U.S. military justice system has been concerned almost
exclusively with what appears to be the institution’s inability to
effectively deter, prosecute, and punish certain sex-related offenses,

354. E.g., Sherman, supra note 179.
355. E.g., DUDLEY, supra note 167; WINTHROP, supra note 10.
356. E.g., Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887) (see text
accompanying note 166, supra); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) (see text
accompanying note 164, supra).
357. E.g., Manual for Courts-Martial (1917), supra note 261.
358. E.g., Kernan Proceedings and Report, supra note 229.
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including rape, assault, and harassment.359 The issue is how much
prosecutorial authority a commanding officer (usually in the rank
of general or admiral) has to decide whether to charge a
servicemember with such a crime and whether to “refer” the case
from its investigative stage to an ad hoc general court-martial.
Debate over this issue seems to polarize around two points of view:
those who question the ability, willingness, and impartiality of
those commanders when making such decisions (with the advice of
their judge advocates) and those who decry the rate of sexual
assault in the military but nevertheless believe ardently that
traditional legal authorities granted by the UCMJ are critical to
combating these offenses effectively and are adequately
safeguarded by current practice and procedures.
Like the claims made a century earlier by those defending the
status quo, these arguments fall into several identifiable bins.
First, there is the arguably spurious and worst-case claim that
removing commanders from the ability to decide when and how to
prosecute these serious crimes ineluctably diminishes “good order
and discipline” in general and “thereby weakening [commanders’]
ability to fight and win wars.”360 As the Judge Advocate General of
the Army testified:
In my professional view, taking away a commander's decision over
discipline – including the decision to prosecute at court-martial – will
fundamentally compromise . . . the readiness and lethality of our
Army today and on the next battlefield.361

Second, there is the claim that adding more lawyers to

359. John M. Donnelly, Congress poised to force historic change in military
justice system, Roll Call (Apr. 30, 2021), www.rollcall.com/2021/04/30/congresspoised-to-force-historic-change-in-military-justice-system/
[perma.cc/XU4CT5RY].
360. Thomas Spoehr & Charles Stimson, Congress, Biden Appear
Determined to Undermine U.S. Military Justice System, HERITAGE FOUND.
(July 23, 2021), www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/congressbiden-appear-determined-undermine-us-military-justice-system
[perma.cc/MB3P-X3S4]; JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., REPORT OF THE
JOINT SERVICE SUBCOMMITTEE PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY STUDY (JSS-PAS)
6
(2020),
www.dacipad.whs.mil/images/Public/10-Reading_Room/
00_PolicyMaterials/13_JSC_Report_Alternative_MJSystem.pdf
[perma.cc/Y6TE-4QSG] [hereinafter PAS Report] (“Reducing the commander’s
authority under the UCMJ to dispose of certain classes of offenses would make
more difficult an already Herculean task: mission accomplishment while
demonstrating the American values enshrined in the Constitution”).
361. Jim Garamone, Top Service Lawyers: Commanders Crucial to Attacking
Sexual Assault, Harassment, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (April 4, 2019),
www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1806147/top-servicelawyers-commanders-crucial-to-attacking-sexual-assault-harassment/
[perma.cc/B6GD-ZL6X] (quoting Lieutenant General Charles Pede); Charles
Dunlap, Outsourcing Military Discipline: Bad for Everyone, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(Oct.
27,
2015),
www.warontherocks.com/2015/10/outsourcing-militarydiscipline-bad-for-everyone/ [perma.cc/H4AT-C6JF].
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decision-making process will actually reduce the quantity of
prosecutions. This speculative claim is premised on the assumption
that commanders are (more) willing to send “hard cases” to trial and
let the judge and court-martial panel determine the facts.362 This
retired general’s statement is worth quoting in full:
When I was a commander, I sent several sexual assault cases to courtmartial, even though the lawyers said we had only a slight chance of
winning. I did so to demonstrate that the command would do
everything possible to hold sexual predators accountable. Were those
decisions made by a military lawyer, I doubt they would have gone to
trial; lawyers – unlike commanders – are bound by ethics rules and
cannot bring a case to trial unless there is a strong likelihood of
success. Absent a commander able to push the process forward, fewer
cases would be referred to trial, and a weaker message would be sent
to the troops.363

Third, there is the claim that because commanders are
responsible for their organization’s or unit’s climate that
perpetuates or stops such crimes, they should be accountable for
prosecuting them, and thus given the legal authority to make that
discretionary call.364 Fourth, there is the claim that might be
paraphrased as: “trust the commander for they are acting in the
unit’s best interest and will make the right decision.”365 Fifth, there
is the related argument that keeping this authority with
commanders is critical for retaining their troops’ confidence and
trust, not in one another but in the commander. Without such trust,
the commander will be unable to sustain the unit cohesion or troop

362. Jordan Stapley & Geoffrey Corn, Military justice reform: The “Be
Careful What You Ask For” Act, MIL. TIMES (June 2, 2021),
www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2021/06/02/military-justicereform-the-be-careful-what-you-ask-for-act/ [perma.cc/8MT2-GZZC].
363. Thomas Spoehr, Dismantling the military justice system will not reduce
sexual assault, HILL (July 13, 2021), www.thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity/562681-dismantling-the-military-justice-system-will-not-reducesexual [perma.cc/T3KV-9AEH].
364. Victor M. Hansen, Removing military commanders from sexual assault
cases won’t yield meaningful solutions, USA TODAY (May 7, 2021),
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/todaysdebate/2021/05/07/removing-militarycommanders-sexual-assault-cases-no-answer-editorials-debates/4886806001/
[perma.cc/3JMV-3UG7].
365. Charles J. Dunlap, Top Ten Reasons Sen. Gillibrand’s Bill is the Wrong
Solution to Military Sexual Assault, JUST SEC’Y (Dec. 9, 2013),
www.justsecurity.org/4403/guest-post-reasons-gillibrand-bill-is-wrong/
[perma.cc/J3HV-27RY] (“it is mindboggling to me as to why anyone would think
that the way to fix anything in the military would be to take the commander out
of the process”); see Charles J. Dunlap, Top Ten Reasons Sen. Gillebrand’s Bill
is the Wrong Solution to Military Sexual Assault, DUKE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY
(Nov.
28,
2013),
www.scholarship.law.duke.edu/
faculty_scholarship/3153/ [perma.cc/K68H-GGF8] (“It is axiomatic in the
military that everything important is commander-led”); and see Dunlap, supra
note 232.
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morale.366 Sixth, there is the claim that prosecution rates in civilian
jurisdictions, as well as in allied militaries where commanders lack
disposition authority, for such crimes are not necessarily better
than those under the current system.367 Seventh, without that trust
and without their ability to levy swift adjudication, it is claimed that
commanders cannot effectively wield the deterrent power of the
UCMJ. This claim implies active management by commanders is
the only way for the UCMJ processes and systems to be managed.368
One recent Department of Defense-organized committee charged
with studying potential changes to commanders’ disposition and
court-martial convening authority concluded:
Military commanders rely on a triad of inspirational leadership,
professional expertise, and the UCMJ to lead their organizations and
carry out their legal and moral responsibility of …safeguard[ing] the
morale, physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers
and enlisted persons under their command or charge. Simply put,
commanders are responsible for ensuring the readiness of their
commands. The triad is not severable or made of distinct functions,
but is blended and emphasized by commanders based on the
circumstances and the mission. Like an uneven stool, a weakness in
any part of the triad diminishes the commander’s capability to fulfill
her obligations. The awesome role and authority of command has few
parallels in society. A commander is singular; she alone is legally and
morally responsible for carrying out her duties. The best
commanders, the ones our service members are entitled to and our
nation trusts the military to produce, rely mostly on their
inspirational leadership and professional competence forged through
experience, augmented with the UCMJ when necessary. Absent the
authority stemming from the UCMJ, an inspirational and competent
leader is impotent. Similarly, a commander who relies on UCMJ
authority alone is an ineffective tyrant.369

This last argument, in particular, strikes the same chord as
those made around World War I – specifically, that the true burden
of expertise – and therefore the burden of decision-making and
judgement – lies with lay commanding officers, not with legal
experts (even those lawyers who are themselves officers).
366. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Military chiefs oppose removing commanders
from
sexual
assault
probes,
CNN
(June
5,
2013),
www.edition.cnn.com/2013/06/04/politics/senate-hearing-military-sexualassault/index.html [perma.cc/8KAQ-QNHP].
367. Dunlap, supra note 88, at 4; see also PAS REPORT, supra note 283, at
69 (quoting Lieutenant General Pede’s testimony regarding the comparison of
ethnic and racial disparities in civilian and military prosecution rates; See
Subcommittee on Military Personnel Hearing: Racial Disparity in the Military
Justice System – How to Fix the Culture, 116th Cong. (June 16, 2020),
www.armedservices.house.gov/hearings?ID=A4D378D4-906F-4D61-B504CAED54EAE38E [perma.cc/84MB-DZWT] (testimony of Lieutenant General
Charles Pede).
368. McLaughlin, supra note 289.
369. PAS REPORT, supra note 283, at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
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Ultimately it prefers to consider misconduct – any misconduct – as
a martial matter in the same way that other forms of discipline
(physical fitness, technical competence, shooting accuracy, tactical
maneuvering, leadership, morale) are martial matters under their
purview and competence. All of these arguments have potential to
be highly relevant and persuasive, for they find their strength in
two sources: history and the assertions of those with “experience”
participating in and administering this system – a position of
privilege (of authority, of knowledge, of responsibility). But as Parts
I and II illustrated, history does not actually lend a hand to
supporters of expansive commander jurisdiction over all kinds of
crimes including those with no martial relevance; moreover,
“experience” is highly contingent on facts and circumstances of
particular crimes, actors, and context – it is therefore helpful to
understand what happened under certain conditions in the past. It
is not necessarily relevant to making predictions about future
events and should be considered suspect when used to buttress
sweeping forecasts of criminal justice system-wide unfairness or
military-wide failures in national security. The character of
prosecutorial decision-making is far too dependent on local
circumstances, local policy, local politics, local law enforcement
resources to be casually simplified and used as the standard by
which to judge the relative worth of military justice – which is itself
dependent on local factors (if it was not dependent, there would be
no value in the promulgating “disposition factors” for commanders
and judge advocates to consider case-by-case370).

VI. CONCLUSION
This article fills two previously unarticulated gaps left open by
the contemporary debate over reforming or retaining some of the
more unique characteristics of military justice. First, the long
history of military codes of discipline has largely been ignored,
instead of focusing on comparing and contrasting current forms of
military justice with modern civilian criminal justice systems.
While giving appropriate and admirable attention to real issues of
victim protection and commander biases, the inattention to history
has resulted in a failure to acknowledge certain undeniable
continuities over time, most notably in the subject matter
jurisdiction of the commander. Historically, only conduct that is
“martial” in character, having articulable harms on the
commander’s ability to perform military missions effectively, has
been capable of commander disposition via legal authorities and
judicial processes. Ignoring this characteristic of military justice
has consequences. It creates a deficit in the argument over a
commander’s professional interest in addressing crimes that involve
370. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 31, app. 2.1.
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no martial harm. Such an argument has depended almost entirely
on those commanders asserting, without argument or evidence, that
mission accomplishment is a function of their quasi-prosecutorial
authority over all misconduct regardless of its martial effect.
This deficit speaks to the second prong of the gap identified by
this article – a continuity of (specious) argumentation. By reviewing
the contentious period of military justice self-reflection that
bookended the first World War, it is evident that claims rooted in
overgeneralized history and dubious predictions of dire
consequences did not cease when reform was finally enacted.
Instead, they continue – and will likely continue – whenever the
traditional or conventional reach of command authority is felt to be
threatened. The leitmotif of the twentieth century was defense of a
sacred theology that demanded belief in the separateness of the
military and assertions that civilians (or military lawyers adopting
civilian due process norms) were not as qualified as the “clergy” of
military leadership to determine what ought to be within their
jurisdiction. The leitmotif of the twenty-first was actually a logical
extension: convention should not be disturbed because to do so
would reject the claim of those “clergy”-like command authorities,
and undermine the martial aims and martial capabilities
presumably preserved by their privileged position in chain-ofcommand and in the justice system. In both eras, advocates for the
conventional relied on speculations premised not on empirical data
but on claims elevating special knowledge applied to special
circumstances requiring those without such specialized experience
to trust the experts. A clear-eyed appreciation of the historical
subject matter jurisdiction of military law, and of the similarities in
the defenses made to rebuff reform proposals, is advantageous to
both contemporary critics and supporters of military justice status
quo.

